Category Archives: Philosophy

Schopenhauer on Happiness.15

16 Thursday Apr 2020

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The previous post in this series may be found here: 

He now begins to present his arguments for solitude:

Solitude is doubly advantageous to such a man. Firstly, it allows him to be with himself, and, secondly, it prevents him being with others–an advantage of great moment; for how much constraint, annoyance, and even danger there is in all intercourse with the world.

This is partially an argument from definition: to be solitary is to be with oneself; and to be solitary is to be apart from others.

Why is this good? Because being others can lead to:

much constraint: by this he apparently means that you can’t really “be yourself” if someone else is around. This leads me to wonder what exactly did Schopenhauer like to do?

Annoyance:  Other people bug me.

Danger: I’m not certain what he means by danger, unless it was mere rhetorical flare. While danger could obviously result from meeting a murderer, is that danger inherent in all interaction?

He then moves one to a matter of assertion:

Rascals are always sociable–more’s the pity! and the chief sign that a man has any nobility in his character is the little pleasure he takes in others’ company.

One does not necessarily follow from the other: there have been dreadful people who loved company. But then I think of the sorry case of the Unibomber, who lived quite alone for many years, shunning most all company. He was a very intelligent and well educated man. And he was also at the very least a “rascal”. The man was a cold-blooded murderer, quite certain he was doing the greatest good:

Men of great intellect live in the world without really belonging to it; and so, from their earliest years, they feel that there is a perceptible difference between them and other people.

There is a transparent bitterness in such sentences. Perhaps this section from the a brief history of his life on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy might give some background:

After a year’s vacation in Italy and with The World as Will and Representation in hand, Schopenhauer applied for the opportunity to lecture at the University of Berlin, the institution at which he had formerly studied, and where two years earlier (1818), Hegel had arrived to assume Fichte’s prestigious philosophical chair. His experiences in Berlin were less than professionally fruitful, however, for in March of 1820, Schopenhauer self-assuredly scheduled his class at a time that was simultaneous with Hegel’s popular lectures, and few students chose to hear Schopenhauer.

Sometimes even great philosophers engage in self-justification.

Schopenhauer on Happiness.14

16 Thursday Apr 2020

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Schopenhauer here offers a wholly negative argument concerning human interaction:

As boredom seems to be an evil of this kind, people band together to offer it a common resistance. The love of life is at bottom only the fear of death; and, in the same way, the social impulse does not rest directly upon the love of society, but upon the fear of solitude; it is not alone the charm of being in others’ company that people seek, it is the dreary oppression of being alone–the monotony of their own consciousness–that they would avoid.

Here is the argument broken down:

Proposition one: Boredom is an evil.

Proposition two: Solitude leads to boredom.

Conclusion: One fears solitude, because solitude will lead to boredom.

Proof of the propositions:  Why is there boredom: (a) it is “dreary oppression;” and (b) one could become bored with one’s own thought, “the monotony of their consciousness”.

Proof of point: Therefore, we “band together” for the purpose of avoiding solitude (and thus, by extension, boredom).

Proof of point:  Analogy to life: One seeks life only due to the fear of death.

Corollary: The benefit of “society” is of margin value.

Having seen the argument in its parts, we can consider the elements severally.

Boredom: While it is unpleasant, it is not an unmitigated evil. For instance, boredom often provokes one to more useful endeavors.  This is related to the nature of solitude.

Solitude: He pick up on this point below in the form of an argument that for the “great”, solitude is not a burden but a benefit because I am alone with my own contemplation.

This leads to a subtle element of this argument: solitude leads to boredom for you lesser sorts; but for me!

Again, there is the irony of writing a book: the book is a social act. It is communication from the author to the reader. And so his solitude argument is not nearly as strong as it may seem.

But there is more. In solitary contemplation, one thinks about not merely raw nature without any social content. If one thinks in a language, that internal language is a matter of social content. No one looks upon the world as complete innocent. When Schopenhauer looked at the physical world without any human present, he still took to it the volume of human learning he had obtained from social content.

And so one person may be more or less solitary than others, but it is always relative.  A person who rejects all time alone or all time with others would limited in some ways.

But since it is Schopenhauer in the dock, let’s consider a truly solitary figure. Let us suppose this man thought the grandest and most valuable thoughts. What could would his contemplations be? What is the value of a human thought never communicated?

Schopenhauer on Happiness.8 Thinking Makes it So

08 Saturday Feb 2020

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Here, Schopenhauer makes the argument that all happiness or woe takes place not in the environment but in the mind: happiness or sorrow or merely how I feel. Or, as he puts it, is “purely intellectual”; it is a matter of the mind.

Whether we are in a pleasant or a painful state depends, ultimately, upon the kind of matter that pervades and engrosses our consciousness. In this respect, purely intellectual occupation, for the mind that is capable of it, will, as a rule, do much more in the way of happiness than any form of practical life, with its constant alternations of success and failure, and all the shocks and torments it produces.

At one level, he makes a correct observation: happiness is not an objection in the environment, like a flower or a star. Happiness is a conclusion about that flower or star. When confronted by a flower, I see it, understand it in some manner and conclude that I am happy.

There is a “natural” movement from a pleasing event or object and a pleased contented experience: in a colloquial manner, the flower “makes” one happy.

He is right that the happiness is not in the flower, but in the person.

For instance, if I have just buried a loved-one and have put flowers on the casket, then the sight of flowers would produce sorrow rather than happiness.

It seems that Schopenhauer counsels a decoupling of the environment from response so that one routinely responds with happiness. Nothing is either good or bad, happy or sad, but thinking makes it so.

Let’s consider this a bit more. There are steps to move from observation of environment to happiness or sorrow. There are the mechanical aspects of observation and recognition.

There is then a evaluative process by which the object becomes meaningful. For instance, the flowers in a garden or the flowers on a grave will each have a different meaning. The meaning takes place in the subject’s intellectual apprehension.

The meaning assigned to the object then produces an emotion: Flowers mean death and loss of someone I loved; I feel sad. The emotion itself is not the result of a conclusion about what emotion I desire; rather the emotion is the result of the meaning I assign to the object and circumstance.

Therefore, I achieve a particular emotion, I do not lean my will upon my emotion. Rather, I must alter my evaluation of the event: I must change the meaning of the event so that the conclusion will be a meaning which produces happiness.

Here are two problems: First, and most importantly for Schopenhauer, what rational basis within the context of his worldview is there for evaluating anything in such a manner as to produce happiness? All of live is accidental, contingent, brief, meaningless. Necessity governs all things; and even my subjective experience of free will is an illusion. (One wonders how I will ever be able to alter my evaluations when they are the result of necessity.)

Second, if ignore the fact that Schopenhauer needs to cheat on his system to even make this argument we have to consider the cost of our reliance upon this process.

We should seek to have increasingly accurate understandings of the world, so that our emotive responses properly follow from experience (and this opens up a great series of issues, which I will bracket for right now). But I take as a self-evident that a goal of one’s understanding of the world should be rational and accurate to the degree possible.

Schopenhauer can provide no basis for why I should hope for a rational or true understanding. Indeed, a rational response would be despair. But since despair is unpleasant and I desire happiness and desiring happiness is itself rational, I should hope for a false understanding of the world. He needs to decouple reason and truth.

And then, we cannot be certain that such a decoupling will itself produce a greater happiness. With the “reasonable” goal of avoiding sorrow we transform the nature of what it is to be human. Our excessive desire to avoid sorrow and pain stunts our development as human beings. There is a depth of joy and love which comes only at excessive cost.

An awakened understanding of loss and the potential of loss and the rarity of joy and love and happiness, causes us to better treasure and better love.

A stoic distance protects us from pain, but at the cost of maturity. Again, we will bracket maturity.

Or take the matter at another level: What do we think of someone who would smile at the death of a child; who would laugh at results of a fire? Would the “happiness” of the one laughing through a cancer ward be a true benefit?

Schopenhauer is correct that happiness or sorrow are the results of “intellectual” exercise; that judgment is in the mind, not in the object. He is implicitly correct that a great deal of sorrow follows from the defects (if you will) in thought. But Schopenhauer can offer no real help in correcting our thought in such a manner to lead to any sort of increase in true (well-grounded) happiness.

The only real thing which he can offer is a Stoic resignation.

At this point, I’d offer some observations of Puritan Thomas Brooks on a Stoic resignation to trouble:

First, There is a stoical silence. The stoics of old thought it altogether below a man that hath reason or understanding either to rejoice in any good, or to mourn for any evil; but this stoical silence is such a sinful insensibleness as is very provoking to a holy God, Isa. 26:10, 11. God will make the most insensible sinner sensible either of his hand here, or of his wrath in hell. It is a heathenish and a horrid sin to be without natural affections, Rom. 1:31. And of this sin Quintus Fabius Maximus seems to be foully guilty, who, when he heard that his mother and wife, whom he dearly loved, were slain by the fall of an house, and that his younger son, a brave, hopeful young man, died at the same time in Umbria, he never changed his countenance, but went on with the affairs of the commonwealth as if no such calamity had befallen him. This carriage of his spoke out more stupidity than patience, Job 36:13.

And so Harpalus was not at all appalled when he saw two of his sons laid ready dressed in a charger, when Astyages had bid him to supper. This was a sottish insensibleness. Certainly if the loss of a child in the house be no more to thee than the loss of a chick in the yard, thy heart is base and sordid, and thou mayest well expect some sore awakening judgment. This age is full of such monsters, who think it below the greatness and magnanimity of their spirits to be moved, affected, or afflicted with any afflictions that befall them. I know none so ripe and ready for hell as these.

Aristotle speaks of fishes, that though they have spears thrust into their sides, yet they awake not. God thrusts many a sharp spear through many a sinner’s heart, and yet he feels nothing, he complains of nothing. These men’s souls will bleed to death. Seneca, Epist. x., reports of Senecio Cornelius, who minded his body more than his soul, and his money more than heaven; when he had all the day long waited on his dying friend, and his friend was dead, he returns to his house, sups merrily, comforts himself quickly, goes to bed cheerfully. His sorrows were ended, and the time of his mourning expired before his deceased friend was interred. Such stupidity is a curse that many a man lies under. But this stoical silence, which is but a sinful sullenness, is not the silence here meant.

 

Schopenhauer on Happiness.7 Unembellished Existence

04 Tuesday Feb 2020

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This is an interesting bit of argumentation and slight of hand:

It is only after a man has got rid of all pretension, and taken refuge in mere unembellished existence, that he is able to attain that peace of mind which is the foundation of human happiness. Peace of mind! that is something

Consider the argument:

If I rid myself of X & take Y, then I’ll get Z

Z is the foundation of human happiness.

Z is wonderful.

The force of the argument is the weight it puts on Z, “peace of mind”. Peace of mind is truly a good thing. The slight of hand takes place in the logical movement from the conditions to the conclusion: Is there really any logical connection?

First, “It is only after a man has got rid of all pretension”. What is the pretension according to Schopenhauer: that the world is meaningful; that there is any providence in this world.  You can only have peace of mind if you realize that your life is meaningless.

The argument is attractive because it makes one sound rational and brave. But we need to stop at that the matter of rationality. What does rationality even mean if the universe is meaningless? Reason can’t have any “real” ground: it is simply an assertion. If the universe is irrational, how then I can assert rationality? Rationality is simply an assertion, a trick of language. How do we say a thing is “true”, if there is no meaning.

Here is the point: Schopenhauer needs rationality and reason and meaning to even begin to assert that the universe is meaningless. I recall reading in Buddhist literature years ago about the need to speak and not speak: the sound of one hand clapping. The assertions of meaningless and ultimate insubstantiality of existence mean that one must speak and then not speak of such things. While there is a remarkable difficulty in the Buddhist position, it is at least honest.

Schopenhauer’s position, I would assert, is incoherent.

What then is the psychological connection between the insistent conclusion that the world is irrational and meaningless, and that I am incoherent, with peace of mind. Wouldn’t such an assertion be anxiety producing?

Moreover, if one considers terror management theory, the assertion that fear of death requires one to raise some sort of psychological defense in order to ward off the anxiety of approaching death; then one would assert that some sort of unvarnished I’m going to die and life is meaningless position would not produce peace.

We can see that Schopenhauer then quickly moves to a position of reason and order:

Limitations always make for happiness. We are happy in proportion as our range of vision, our sphere of work, our points of contact with the world, are restricted and circumscribed.

And:

Simplicity, therefore, as far as it can be attained, and even monotony, in our manner of life, if it does not mean that we are bored, will contribute to happiness; just because, under such circumstances, life, and consequently the burden which is the essential concomitant of life, will be least felt.

What these positions reduce to, psychologically, is that avoiding circumstances which have the potential of producing anxiety helps one to feel better. Ignoring problems which cannot be resolved is an obvious means of reducing anxiety – but what this has to do with the underlying assertion that life is meaningless is difficult to understand.

 

Schopenhauer on Happiness.6 (Anxiety; Comparison with Jesus)

30 Thursday Jan 2020

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Here he raises something which sounds rather useful, but upon consideration seems to be difficult to apply:

Only those evils which are sure to come at a definite date have any right to disturb us; and how few there are which fulfill this description. For evils are of two kinds; either they are possible only, at most probable; or they are inevitable. Even in the case of evils which are sure to happen, the time at which they will happen is uncertain. A man who is always preparing for either class of evil will not have a moment of peace left him. So, if we are not to lose all comfort in life through the fear of evils, some of which are uncertain in themselves, and others, in the time at which they will occur, we should look upon the one kind as never likely to happen, and the other as not likely to happen very soon.

For instance, we may assume that our philosopher was an anxious fellow and thus found himself worrying about things which may never happen. Or perhaps he had such a friend: the advice to “calm down” makes sense. The mere act of being anxious does nothing to solve a problem; one has an unpleasant sensation currently, but the current sensation does nothing to change tomorrow.

However, preparing for contingencies is wise. By preparing today, perhaps I can avoid an event tomorrow.

Moreover, how can we really know the probabilities of future events? Sure some things are less likely, but unlikely things happen.

Moreover, what about things which I know will happen? Should I be worried about such things.

His advice is: If it’s going to happen, it will. You don’t know; you can’t prepare; so don’t worry. I think a further part of advice is tied to his conception of the world. If the world is effectively random (in the sense that I can’t really know what will happen, and what will happen follows no prescription other than the laws of physics), a constant anxiety is a “natural” result.

In response, Schopenhauer offers only, look you’re just making yourself feel bad. That is true. But is sort of like walking blindfolded, knowing that at some moment, someone is going to hit in the head with a baseball bat. Sure feeling bad right now won’t stop the bat, but it is really hard to walk into such an end.

It makes a certain amount of “sense”, but it seems terribly difficult to maintain equanimity. The trouble with his advice is that the emotion is a proper interpretation of the world. The problem is not the interpretation, it is inability to alter the bad outcome.

There is no basis to not be anxious other than it feels bad.

Compare that with

Matthew 6:25–34 (ESV)

 25 “Therefore I tell you, do not be anxious about your life, what you will eat or what you will drink, nor about your body, what you will put on. Is not life more than food, and the body more than clothing? 26 Look at the birds of the air: they neither sow nor reap nor gather into barns, and yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not of more value than they? 27 And which of you by being anxious can add a single hour to his span of life? 28 And why are you anxious about clothing? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow: they neither toil nor spin, 29 yet I tell you, even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. 30 But if God so clothes the grass of the field, which today is alive and tomorrow is thrown into the oven, will he not much more clothe you, O you of little faith? 31 Therefore do not be anxious, saying, ‘What shall we eat?’ or ‘What shall we drink?’ or ‘What shall we wear?’ 32 For the Gentiles seek after all these things, and your heavenly Father knows that you need them all. 33 But seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things will be added to you.

 34 “Therefore do not be anxious about tomorrow, for tomorrow will be anxious for itself. Sufficient for the day is its own trouble.

Here, the command to not feel anxious is similar to Schopenhauer, on the ground that current anxiety does no good. But the counsel is based upon an assertion of providence: God is taking care of what is happening. The trouble with anxiety is not that it is ineffective. The trouble with anxiety is that it is irrational: the world is not running at chance.

Thus, at the level of immediate psychological sensation, the advice is similar; but the ground of the advice is fundamentally different. Schopenhauer: the world is random, so why concern yourself with what will happen? Your current bad feelings are warranted, but won’t help.

Or, you’re in a car which is careening out of control down a hill. You’ll crash in a few minutes or a few seconds; don’t know which. Being afraid makes all sorts of sense; but it really won’t slow down the car. Your emotion is rational, but ineffective.

Jesus: the world is under the providential control of God, so why are you worried? Your current bad feelings are based upon a misunderstanding of the world.

You’re in a car which is being driven by an ultimately skilled driver. There’s no reason to be afraid. Your fear is based upon a misunderstanding; it makes no sense.

 

Schopenhauer On Happiness 5 (Present and Future)

28 Tuesday Jan 2020

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Here Schopenhauer argues for a middle way between the present and the future.

SECTION 5. Another important element in the wise conduct of life is to preserve a proper proportion between our thought for the present and our thought for the future; in order not to spoil the one by paying over-great attention to the other.

Those who strive and hope and live only in the future, always looking ahead and impatiently anticipating what is coming, as something which will make them happy when they get it, are, in spite of their very clever airs, exactly like those donkeys one sees in Italy, whose pace may be hurried by fixing a stick on their heads with a wisp of hay at the end of it; this is always just in front of them, and they keep on trying to get it. Such people are in a constant state of illusion as to their whole existence; they go on living ad interim, until at last they die.

How exactly does this concern function? It seems that his concern is that one will miss a current benefit but fixing attention on the future. There would be a failure to enjoy some good currently in hand, in favor of a proposed good which may come into existence in the future.

The donkey staring at the carrot will never see the good things which pass him by, because he is fixed so intently upon the future.

As such, he is offering standard “good advice”. But there is a question here: how does his advice square with his philosophy. If the only true good is renunciation of the present and a desire not to obtain good but rather to avoid pain, a focus on the future to the exclusion of the present might be psychologically effective.

He also does not seem to considering the question of hope at this point: If I am sick and I have no hope of recovering, my relationship to my illness will be quite different than if I am sick an hope to soon recover. In fact, my recovery will be helped by my hope to recover.

A reward which will come at the end of a present effort will provide motivation to complete task. One would not perform the work without the promise of reward.

There seems to an inconsistency in his approach at this point. Yes, one could nuance the matter in a way that many systems do to avoid there most difficult inconsistencies. But Schopenhauer seems to see no inconsistency here.

Schopenhauer on Happiness, 4: A Comparison with St. Paul

26 Sunday Jan 2020

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He goes onto define happiness in terms of the absence of pain rather than obtaining pleasure:

To estimate a man’s condition in regard to happiness, it is necessary to ask, not what things please him, but what things trouble him; and the more trivial these things are in themselves, the happier the man will be. To be irritated by trifles, a man must be well off; for in misfortunes trifles are unfelt.

Now this is a seemingly paradoxical statement, but it makes some sense. If one is starving to death, trivial things will not matter. To even take notice of trivial inconvenience is evidence of privilege. If I am starving, I will not much care if something is out of place: I will care about obtaining food. When one comes to their death bed, even bill collectors are irrelevant.

This observation is true, but I don’t see how that is really conducive to any sort of happiness. I would think one should draw the opposite conclusion, especially from Schopenhauer’s ready pessimism. Seeing that we are all soon to die, and everything will decay, why ignore all trivialities and look at them now as we will look at them upon our death bed. We will soon enough be dead, so why sweat anything at the present?

In the opposite direction, he counsels we should set out happiness very few:

Care should be taken not to build the happiness of life upon a broad foundation–not to require a great many things in order to be happy. For happiness on such a foundation is the most easily undermined; it offers many more opportunities for accidents; and accidents are always happening.

Paul makes an argument which has a similar structure:

1 Timothy 6:6–10 (ESV)

 6 But godliness with contentment is great gain, 7 for we brought nothing into the world, and we cannot take anything out of the world. 8 But if we have food and clothing, with these we will be content. 9 But those who desire to be rich fall into temptation, into a snare, into many senseless and harmful desires that plunge people into ruin and destruction. 10 For the love of money is a root of all kinds of evils. It is through this craving that some have wandered away from the faith and pierced themselves with many pangs.

The similarity lies in the realization that we will die and this world is uncertain. Therefore, we should expect to obtain very little from this life. Indeed, an overarching desire to have happiness fixed upon the fleeting things of this world will lead to ruin and sorrow.

But Paul couches the argument in a different context. Schopenhauer sees life as transitory, but there is no sense of redemption of the transitory. Paul sets content on very little within the context of godliness. The Christian hope is not that this world in its present cursed form will be made permanent, but rather that the world will be remade:

Romans 8:18 (ESV)

18 For I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us.

It is worth noting that the Hebrew word for “glory” is a word which has the sense of “heavy” or substantial. Paul is writing to the Romans in Greek (and he next raises the issue of the vanity of the creation), but the concept of glory developed in the OT would affect his thinking.

And so to compare and contrast Schopenhauer and Paul: They both see life as resting on vanity; the world will decay and we will die. But realize that the things of this world cannot be trusted. The difference is that Schopenhauer sees the decay the as the end. There is not any real point in this world except perhaps to be made sadder and wiser:

Men of any worth or value soon come to see that they are in the hands of Fate, and gratefully submit to be moulded by its teachings. They recognize that the fruit of life is experience, and not happiness; they become accustomed and content to exchange hope for insight; and, in the end, they can say, with Petrarch, that all they care for is to learn:–

When we are actually doing some great deed, or creating some immortal work, we are not conscious of it as such; we think only of satisfying present aims, of fulfilling the intentions we happen to have at the time, of doing the right thing at the moment. It is only when we come to view our life as a connected whole that our character and capacities show themselves in their true light; that we see how, in particular instances, some happy inspiration, as it were, led us to choose the only true path out of a thousand

But it is hard to say that there is anything good in this wisdom:

Ecclesiastes 2:12–17 (ESV)

 12 So I turned to consider wisdom and madness and folly. For what can the man do who comes after the king? Only what has already been done. 13 Then I saw that there is more gain in wisdom than in folly, as there is more gain in light than in darkness. 14 The wise person has his eyes in his head, but the fool walks in darkness. And yet I perceived that the same event happens to all of them. 15 Then I said in my heart, “What happens to the fool will happen to me also. Why then have I been so very wise?” And I said in my heart that this also is vanity. 16 For of the wise as of the fool there is no enduring remembrance, seeing that in the days to come all will have been long forgotten. How the wise dies just like the fool! 17 So I hated life, because what is done under the sun was grievous to me, for all is vanity and a striving after wind.

Wisdom is very little worth if the only thing it can do is make me aware that I will die and all things are pointless. Merely managing my sorrows and disappointments may give me some equanimity; or it may just be boring. How do you measure the relative “happiness” of a life spent avoiding pain (Schopenhauer), plunging into pleasure and pain (Shelley). That seems more a matter of taste and temperament than better or worse.

It is at this point, the Christian view is profoundly different. Yes, the world is vain; we will die: the creation, after all, is under a curse. Therefore, let us be content with food and clothing in this world; and – here is the distinction – and hope for redemption:

Romans 8:19–25 (ESV)

19 For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God. 20 For the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly, but because of him who subjected it, in hope 21 that the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to corruption and obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God. 22 For we know that the whole creation has been groaning together in the pains of childbirth until now. 23 And not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the firstfruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait eagerly for adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies. 24 For in this hope we were saved. Now hope that is seen is not hope. For who hopes for what he sees? 25 But if we hope for what we do not see, we wait for it with patience.

Schopenhauer can at most help one whistle past the graveyard. It is a sort of sour grapes philosophy. You’ll just make me sad, anyway.

The Christian answer however takes an equally steel-eyed view of the world and its pain and says that it will be transformed. The answer matches perfectly to the loss. That is either the mark of its truth or its utter fraudulence. The resurrection is the perfect answer to death. Death is a horror turned inside-out.

(There is another issue here: how can any future answer to individual horrors of this life? How can disease which ravages a child, or slavery, or abuse be answered for?  Too often the answer sounds like, Let me beat you senseless, but I’ll make it okay by giving you some money afterwards. That is not the right answer; nor is it the promise of glory. But that is for another time.)

Schopenhauer on Happiness (3c, Ecclesiastes)

23 Thursday Jan 2020

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Schopenhauer quite rightly notes that all is impermanent and all will decay. His solution is to reject all hope and expectation and thus avoid disappointment. As we have seen from Shakespeare and Shelley, this is not the only potential response. One could bemoan the tragedy of loss (Macbeth), receive the knowledge with equanimity (Tempest), or realize there will be loss and thus hold more tightly to and cherish what is good knowing that it will all soon be lost (Shakespeare & Shelley).

Another response is the redemption of all that is lost. The book of Ecclesiastes famously declares, “Vanity of vanities, all is vanity”. Eccl. 1:2 Vanity translates a Hebrew word Hebel, which refers to something which is transient, insubstantial, like a breath or mist. From that, the writer draws the conclusion that nothing is world is sufficient to bring contentment to anyone in this life:

Ecclesiastes 2:10–11 (ESV)

10 And whatever my eyes desired I did not keep from them. I kept my heart from no pleasure, for my heart found pleasure in all my toil, and this was my reward for all my toil. 11 Then I considered all that my hands had done and the toil I had expended in doing it, and behold, all was vanity and a striving after wind, and there was nothing to be gained under the sun.

That however does not end the matter:

Ecclesiastes 12:13–14 (ESV)

13 The end of the matter; all has been heard. Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man. 14 For God will bring every deed into judgment, with every secret thing, whether good or evil.

That matter of bringing everything into judgment may sound ominous. However, what it means in the context of the world being temporal is that the world is also meaningful: There will be a date on which all things which be confirmed as having eternal significance.  The solution to the temporality of the world is not renounce the world and all its good; nor is it to love in despair. Rather, knowing that the temporal world will be judged and remade as a permanent matter will make this world and life meaningful.

In the 15th chapter of his first letter to the Corinthian church Paul lays out the Christian doctrine of the resurrection, wherein even the human body will not be lost but will be remade in an unchanging manner:

1 Corinthians 15:42 (ESV)

 42 So is it with the resurrection of the dead. What is sown is perishable; what is raised is imperishable.

In light of the resurrection, our life and work is not meaningless:

1 Corinthians 15:58 (ESV)

 58 Therefore, my beloved brothers, be steadfast, immovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, knowing that in the Lord your labor is not in vain.

By stating their labor is not in vain, Paul is underscoring the permanence of human existence. The mutability of the world is not the last word. The Christian sees the world as temporal, along with the Buddhist, but rather than seeing the end as dissolution, sees the end as permanence:

2 Corinthians 4:16–18 (ESV)

 16 So we do not lose heart. Though our outer self is wasting away, our inner self is being renewed day by day. 17 For this light momentary affliction is preparing for us an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison, 18 as we look not to the things that are seen but to the things that are unseen. For the things that are seen are transient, but the things that are unseen are eternal.

Therefore, happiness is not contingent upon renunciation, nor must one “cross-fingers”, and know that the joy will be destroyed. Rather, the goal is set hope upon permanent joys.

Schopenhauer on Happiness 3b (Mutability, Poem by Shelley)

21 Tuesday Jan 2020

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Contemporary with Schopenhauer is the English Romantic Poet Percy Shelley.

I.

The flower that smiles to-day

To-morrow dies;

All that we wish to stay

Tempts and then flies.

What is this world’s delight?

Lightning that mocks the night,

Brief even as bright.

 

This first stanza comes closet to Schopenhauer’s pessimism. The flower “dies”. Those things we desire “tempt” and then they “fly”. He speaks of the world as purposefully causing this pain. Delight in this world “mocks” and has as much permanence as lightning at night.

 

But there is a hint here of something else: The flower “smiles”. That temptation is of a “delight”. Lightning may mock, but it is bright.

 

The final line “brief even as bright”.

 

II.

Virtue, how frail it is!

Friendship how rare!

Love, how it sells poor bliss

For proud despair!

But we, though soon they fall,

Survive their joy, and all

Which ours we call.

 

He moves from the physical to the moral world. Virtue is “frail”. Friendship is “rare”. Love turns to “despair”. Again, there is another side to these things: Virtue and friendship are good things, hence, the trouble of their loss. Love entails “bliss”. And these things all pertain to “joy”. They are lost, but they are good.

 

III.

Whilst skies are blue and bright,

Whilst flowers are gay,

Whilst eyes that change ere night

Make glad the day;

Whilst yet the calm hours creep,

Dream thou—and from thy sleep

Then wake to weep.

 

At this point, Shelley offers a very different take than Schopenhauer. The philosopher will caution against any joy or good; he will seek no bliss, no delight. He will protect himself from loss by cutting off the elation and thus avoiding the loss.

 

Shelley offers a different solution: to enjoy these things now. He marks the time in a series of three lines “whilst”:

 

Whilst skies are blue and bright,

Whilst flowers are gay,

Whilst eyes that change ere night

 

While these good things last, do not reject them like (as Schopenhauer counsels), rather:

 

Make glad the day;

 

This is an interesting line, because until now the joys have been received. But here he gives counsel: you actively make the day glad, you drink in this joy.

 

He then turns to a resolution:

 

Whilst yet the calm hours creep,

Dream thou

 

Drink in this joy, but know that this is a “dream”. It is a joy which will not last. But even that passion is not to be lost:

 

and from thy sleep

Then wake to weep.

 

This in the Romantic vein of drinking in all passion. In the Prelude, Wordsworth refers to the poet

 

Crazed

By love and feeling, and internal though

Protracted among endless solitudes (V, 145-147)

 

Both Shelley and Shakespeare have looked directly into change and loss. But they provide a model of using the loss as the basis for passionately holding onto what will last.

Arthur Schopenhauer On Happiness 3a (Mutability)

19 Sunday Jan 2020

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The rationale for Schopenhauer’s renunciation as the basis for happiness lies in the mutability of the physical world:

The chief obstacle to our arriving at these salutary views is that hypocrisy of the world to which I have already alluded–an hypocrisy which should be early revealed to the young. Most of the glories of the world are mere outward show, like the scenes on a stage: there is nothing real about them. Ships festooned and hung with pennants, firing of cannon, illuminations, beating of drums and blowing of trumpets, shouting and applauding–these are all the outward sign, the pretence and suggestion,–as it were the hieroglyphic,–of joy: but just there, joy is, as a rule, not to be found; it is the only guest who has declined to be present at the festival.

While Schopenhauer derived his concept of renunciation due to mutability based upon a Buddhist (which is consonant with Hindu concepts) understanding of reality. However, in evaluating his reading, we should also compare this language with Western responses to mutability. First, concepts of mutability were being addressed in contemporary Western Romanticism as well as Western thought generally. Second, by considering a different consideration of the same proposition from a different direction, we have a greater perspective to evaluate the matter.

Schopenhauer’s metaphor to life being a play (“Most of the glories of the world are mere outward show, like the scenes on a stage: there is nothing real about them), appears much in Shakespeare. Perhaps the closest analogy is found in Macbeth’s speech upon hearing that his wife has died and now his downfall is in view:

(FTLN 2278) [19]     The Queen, my lord, is dead.

Macbeth

(FTLN 2279) [20]     She should have died hereafter.

(FTLN 2280) [21]     There would have been a time for such a word.

(FTLN 2281) [22]     Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow

(FTLN 2282) [23]     Creeps in this petty pace from day to day

(FTLN 2283) [24]     To the last syllable of recorded time,

(FTLN 2284) [25]     And all our yesterdays have lighted fools

(FTLN 2285) [26]     The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!

(FTLN 2286) [27]     Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player

(FTLN 2287) [28]     That struts and frets his hour upon the stage

(FTLN 2288) [29]     And then is heard no more. It is a tale

(FTLN 2289) [30]     Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,

(FTLN 2290) [31]     Signifying nothing.

 

Act V, 5, 19-31. Schopenhauer has a similar view to Macbeth when it comes to the matter of the mutability of the world. Seeing that the world is impermanent, life is meaningless and is best not trusted. This is especially poignant in Macbeth, in that he has been destroying a kingdom and committing murder upon murder to obtain something which he hoped would be permanent: a kingdom. But even in that, he was told that the throne would not pass to his son.

There is thus the irony of seeking to obtain something seemingly powerful and permanent: a throne; and to seek it by proving that neither the throne nor life is permanent.

A similar but different view of the matter is found in The Tempest, Shakespeare’s farewell to the stage.

The Magician Prospero has put a play acted by spirits who appear from nowhere and then vanish just as quickly when Prospero needs to attend to other business. The young man who marry is daughter is distraught at the sudden disappearance of the spirits. Prospero then turns to him and uses the doctrine of mutability to explain the matter:

Prospero, ⌜to Ferdinand⌝

(FTLN 1832) [163]   You do look, my son, in a moved sort,

(FTLN 1833) [164]   As if you were dismayed. Be cheerful, sir.

(FTLN 1834) [165]   Our revels now are ended. These our actors,

(FTLN 1835) [166]   As I foretold you, were all spirits and

(FTLN 1836) [167]   Are melted into air, into thin air;

(FTLN 1837) [168]   And like the baseless fabric of this vision,

(FTLN 1838) [169]   The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces,

(FTLN 1839) [170]   The solemn temples, the great globe itself,

(FTLN 1840) [171]   Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,

(FTLN 1841) [172]   And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,

(FTLN 1842) [173]   Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff

(FTLN 1843) [174]   As dreams are made on, and our little life

(FTLN 1844) [175]   Is rounded with a sleep. Sir, I am vexed.

(FTLN 1845) [176]   Bear with my weakness. My old brain is troubled.

(FTLN 1846) [177]   Be not disturbed with my infirmity.

(FTLN 1847) [178]   If you be pleased, retire into my cell

(FTLN 1848) [179]   And there repose. A turn or two I’ll walk

(FTLN 1849) [180]   To still my beating mind.

Act IV, Scene 1, lines 163-180. This physical world is insubstantial, so why should a plain realization of this fact trouble you so. Shakespeare does not resolve this tension immediately, but does it work it out through the action of the play.

In Macbeth the usurpation of the king by murder results in the destruction of Macbeth and enormous sorrow for the kingdom. In the Tempest, the usurpation of the Duke (who becomes the magician on the island) is resolved by the restoration of his throne through the marriage of his daughter to the Prince of Naples.

When the play is read against the most common understanding which is Shakespeare giving his leave to the theater, there are various levels of irony. The play within the play is dissolved at the word of the Magician. The play itself is dissolved and the characters are released from their duty to the audience:

(FTLN 2344)          [1]               Now my charms are all o’erthrown,

(FTLN 2345)          [2]               And what strength I have ’s mine own,

(FTLN 2346)          [3]               Which is most faint. Now ’tis true

(FTLN 2347)          [4]               I must be here confined by you,

(FTLN 2348)          [5]               Or sent to Naples. Let me not,

(FTLN 2349)          [6]               Since I have my dukedom got

(FTLN 2350)          [7]               And pardoned the deceiver, dwell

(FTLN 2351)          [8]               In this bare island by your spell,

(FTLN 2352)          [9]               But release me from my bands

(FTLN 2353)        [10]               With the help of your good hands.

(FTLN 2354)        [11]               Gentle breath of yours my sails

(FTLN 2355)        [12]               Must fill, or else my project fails,

(FTLN 2356)        [13]               Which was to please. Now I want

(FTLN 2357)        [14]               Spirits to enforce, art to enchant,

(FTLN 2358)        [15]               And my ending is despair,

(FTLN 2359)        [16]               Unless I be relieved by prayer,

(FTLN 2360)        [17]               Which pierces so that it assaults

(FTLN 2361)        [18]               Mercy itself, and frees all faults.

(FTLN 2362)        [19]                     As you from crimes would pardoned be,

(FTLN 2363)        [20]                     Let your indulgence set me free.

He exits.

It was magic which presented the momentary world of the play, “Now my charms are all o’erthrown”. But within the logic of the play, he would be forced to stay on a “baren” island rather than returned to his dukedom: By the audience letting lose of the illusion of the play, the Magician is permitted to return to his “real” or proper life. When we take a step back and put this into the context of Shakespeare’s life, Shakespeare then would leave the false and magic world for the “real” life at his home.

But notice here that the temporality of the world in this play is not a cause for despair, but rather of release and rest. The play ends with “mercy” and “forgiveness”.

In Sonnet 73, Shakespeare uses the temporality of life as the basis to drive the intensity of the love:

73

[1]       That time of year thou mayst in me behold

[2]       When yellow leaves, or none, or few, do hang

[3]       Upon those boughs which shake against the cold,

[4]       Bare ruined choirs where late the sweet birds sang.

[5]       In me thou see’st the twilight of such day

[6]       As after sunset fadeth in the west,

[7]       Which by and by black night doth take away,

[8]       Death’s second self, that seals up all in rest.

[9]       In me thou see’st the glowing of such fire

[10]     That on the ashes of his youth doth lie,

[11]     As the death-bed whereon it must expire,

[12]     Consumed with that which it was nourished by.

[13]     This thou perceiv’st, which makes thy love more strong,

[14]     To love that well which thou must leave ere long.

In short, the mutability of life is seen as a catastrophe and tragedy in Macbeth, whose life is marked by murder and usurping the crown. But in other circumstances, the brevity of life can be seen as a basis to better cherish and love the instant world.

In fact, he points to an even deeper reality, a truer life which stands behind the changeable play of this world.