Tag Archives: Apologetics

An observation on “A Neuroscientist Prepares for Death”

10 Monday Jan 2022

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In a recent article in The Atlantic, A Neuroscientist Prepares for Death, a poor man who has learned he will soon die from cancer of the heart provides his philosophical reflection concerning the possibility of an afterlife. Using his expertise as a scientist, he makes a series of three unwarranted jumps to deny an afterlife.

Lut us begin with the scientific proposition, “Now we know that rather than merely reacting to the external world, the brain spends much of its time and energy actively making predictions about the future.” This statement is metaphysically loaded, because it attributes all thought to a physical process, “the brain.”

His conclusion about the “brain” as opposed to a mind goes well beyond anything in observational science. The fact that certain brain functions are associated with a particular mental state does not mean the brain processes are that mental state. The mental state is itself unobservable, it can only be subjectively experienced. The relationship between a brain state and a mental state is a matter of tremendous dispute, but it is simply lazy to collapse thought into synaptic firing.

The second error in his argument comes when concludes that since we anticipate the near future, we cannot anticipate not anticipating the future. “And because our brains are organized to predict the near future, it presupposes that there will, in fact, be a near future. ” But this conclusion actually goes beyond the observation that the brain works to predict the future. There is no reason that the brain could not predict its demise. Our inability to imagine the future cannot be explained simply on the basis that the “brain” makes predictions about the near future.

From the observation that we do not imagine our non-existence, a state he refers to as a “widespread glitch”, he makes a theological/philosophical observation. The widespread religious belief in an afterlife is simply the result of a cognitive glitch which itself results from the mental action of anticipating the future.

But this last step is as lacking in necessary inference as the previous steps. A. The argument also entails a number of other unstated propositions. For instance, the argument assumes that there is no such a thing as an afterlife, and thus the belief must be explained by some material process.

B. The fact there are physical processes consistent with a particular belief does not make the belief untrue. Why would a religious belief have to be inconsistent with physical function to be true? There is no necessity that a religious belief be inconsistent to physical function.

C. Our inability to imagine our nonexistence does not make belief in an afterlife false. The argument that “belief in an afterlife cannot be true because it is comforting” is simply false. When I am ill, I believe that I will recover. On all prior occasions in which I have been ill, I have believed that I will recover–which is a comforting thought. And it was a true comforting belief: I have always recovered.

He ends with the observation that he is not adverse to the existence of an afterlife with those whom he loves.

What then is the purpose of an essay like this? We must remember it cannot be for career advancement, he will die soon. I can’t imagine that the prestige of writing for The Atlantic is sufficient as an explanation.

I think it is to deal with the fear of death. But in what way? His argument is that because I’m a scientist I know there is no afterlife. Why would he need to convince himself (an essay like this is an argument to convince you so that I feel more comfort in my belief) there is no afterlife?

As a Christian, I take it as a given that human beings fear the judgment which lies beyond death. If there is no continuation of life, there is judgment day coming after death. And so he strings out this rather insufficient argument to prove to himself there will be no future.

Hebrews 2:14–15 (ESV)

14 Since therefore the children share in flesh and blood, he himself likewise partook of the same things, that through death he might destroy the one who has the power of death, that is, the devil, 15 and deliver all those who through fear of death were subject to lifelong slavery.

Kierkegaard, What it means to seek God.7 The existential crisis

07 Thursday Oct 2021

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This brings us to the existential crisis which lies so importantly at the crux of Kierkegaard’s thought. (Now those who have much greater expertise may identify a different controlling idea in the Dane’s thinking, and will defer to their greater knowledge. But from what I have read, this seems to be the motivating conceit).

The one who, by reason, no longer experiences Romantic Wordsworthian Wonder at a flower or shadowy forrest, finds himself in a strange place. At this point, we know that there things which could inspire a lesser wonder and a lesser fear: a fear of an angel or devil; or a fear of some terror in the world. But all such fears can at most lead to superstition.

But there is a true and wonder and a true fear which can be experienced when the false fears are cleared away.

“True wonder and fear first appear only when he, just he, whether greatest or humblest, is alone with the omnipresent God.”

True wonder and fear fear appear only when he, just he, whether greatest or humblest, is alone with the omnipresent God

It matters nothing who the human being is when confronted with this God. All things in the creature matter nothing: that confrontation with God is a confrontation of pure fear and wonder. This fear and wonder are secure from an assault of reason: reason can merely clear away the creaturely wonders and fears.

“The experience here described was once the lot of every man in the moment of decision, when the sickness of the spirit struck in, and he felt himself imprisioned in existence, everlasting imprisoned.” What he means by this everlasting imprisonment I think must be mean the apparent inability to move past this confrontation.

The thought becomes particularly opaque (at least to me), but the sense seems to be unless one is changed at this confrontation, there is an imprisonment. This is the confrontation of “fear and trembling” and movement to the stage of faith (the “leap”).

Here is the salient passage, “Therefore the thing sought exists, the seeker himself was the place [because we find God in faith in the confession of sin — as will be explained later], but he is change, changed from having once been the place whether the thing sought was [this is the movement in the thought which I find confusing]. Oh, now there is no wonder, no ambiguity! When the soul apprehends this, its condition is fear and trembling in the consciousness of guilt, passion in the sorrow following remembrance, love in the repentance of the prodigal.”

I am not quite sure about that clause of the seeker having once been the place. But the remainder makes sense: this existential confrontation of the living God is the confrontation of a realization that of my guilt and of knowing that I am loved in the confession of and repentance from sin. It is the paradoxical moment of grace: that I am received precisely in the moment I realize I am bound to be cast-off.

God justifies the ungodly; God shows love for the unlovely. Indeed, it is precisely when one realizes one’s complete unworthiness that the Father welcomes in the prodigal and gives him the robe and the ring and fattened calf. If that moment is achieved, there is nothing in human existence which can equal it for importance.

There is one final note which to make about this section of the discourse concerning apologetics. It is a brief section, but it is worth considering. Someone may “wish” to say, “it is so hard to find Him [God] that some men even prove that He exists, and find evidence necessary.” At this point, one could accuse Kierkegaard of pure fideism: he merely asserts God exists. But he continues on at this point in a way which I think is helpful when we consider apologetics. “Let the work of proving it be hard and especially troublesome for him who tries to understand that it proves anything; for the author of the proof, it is easy because he has place himself outside, he does not deal with God, but considers something about God.”

God is personal — absolutely so. Yet, so often in our theology of God, and particularly in apologetics, we can reduce God to an object of our consideration. We speak about God and reduce God to an inference. But for the one who knows God, we do not merely know about God. Indeed, we cannot now the most critical elements of Christianity by deduction from historical evidence. We could prove up the death and burial of Jesus. We can make a quite cogent argument for the Resurrection. All those facts could be unquestionably true, but they cannot lead us to understand that Jesus died for me. I cannot know God in Jesus Christ except by knowing in experience.

It is that experience which is the most critical event in the life of a human being. If our apologetics is to be greatest use it must be more than winning an argument over historical deduction. And we must be careful that we do not merely “something about God” rather than God.

A note about the argument that God is really a delusional instance of wish fulfillment

02 Monday Aug 2021

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(This is not a case completed argument. It is just a sketch I may get back to)

A common argument against the existence of the God of the Bible contends this God is mere wish fulfillment: you wish for such a God and so pretend he exists.

This contains (at least) two arguments.

1 God does not exist just because you wish he did

2 A God for whom you wish conforming to your wish is evidence God does not exist

Thinking of this second argument

A Why wouldn’t God correspond to human desire? Would it be illogical for God to create human beings that would feel their way towards him and find him? Acts 17:27

B Does the God of the Bible actually look like a bare wish fulfillment? He is at least as upsetting for human culture as any wish could entail?

C (I do not know who originated this response) Just because a sailor on a raft wishes for land does not mean land does not exist.

There is then an irony in the use of this argument. Sometimes the argument is used by one who also contends that the God of the Bible does not exist because that God does not conform to *my* expectations. This brings us to point 2b, above.

If the Christian proposition of Fall and Redemption is true then a God who conforms and unsettles is what should happen. The relationship between humanity and God is – to use a modern idiom – “complicated”

The true wish fulfillment God would be one who happens to confirm one’s present culture: a god who confirms me. But the Christian God says take up your cross,

Be crucified to the world, put to death “what is earthly in you.” That is an odd wish (especially since the last command comes immediately after the instruction that asceticism is not profitable Col. 2:20-23)

Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic 4.4 (with some notes on current Church)

29 Friday Jan 2021

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The pervious post in this series concerning Rieff may be found here: https://memoirandremains.com/2020/08/28/philip-rieff-the-triumph-of-the-therapeutic-4-3/

In the remainder of the book, Rieff is going to examine what various disciples of Freud did with Freud’s original work. Thus, we will examine Jung, Wilhelm Reich, and D.H. Lawrence. But before he turns to these men who developed the ideas of Freud in strikingly different directions, Rieff considers those who make up the mass of psychoanalysts. In the main, Rieff has little good say about such practioners.

The fault, as I read Rieff, is that the analysts follow Freud so well. The practice of psychoanalysis is not to construct some new culture but rather to free one from the symbolic world which they have internalized. As such, it is a sort of indefinite project, but the world which followed Freud domesticated it, Freud “could cope with his enemies; his friends defeated him.” (85) 

Those who take up the practice have attended “trade schools” (89) who wish to take up a quiet, stable, “suburb[an]” life.

The need for conflict with opposing structures is necessary to keep the disciple alive, “As an ultimate rule of organization, honesty is death to organization itself. Reticence, forbearance, tolerance – these civilities and hypocrisies are necessary to organized life.” (91)

To that extent his epilogue is of little interest except as an observation. What I do find interesting is an observation he makes early in this section. He notes that orthodoxy is sharpened in conflict: which is a point Harold O.J. Brown made in his work Heresies.

It is at this point he makes a point which may be of some encouragement to Christianity at this point in the West, “Nowadays, the world is full of tame Christians; in consequence, the churches are empty of life, if not of people.” (84) The Church seems to suffer worse from excess of ease than even trial (which seems to be true for us personally as well).  Thus, our current conflict may be of use by putting the church into a position where it may critique the culture rather than be overly at home. 

While there are various positions which have been offered by many, such as Niebuhr’s Christ & Culture, (Christ Against Culture, Christ of Culture, Christ Above Culture, Christ and Culture in Paradox, Christ the Transformer of Culture), Luther’s Two Kingdoms, and so on. All of these positions have shown themselves to be useful at some times and places, and disastrous at others. 

When the Netherlands can elect a Kuyper as Prime Minister, Christianity is a position to influence culture in a way that the Baptist in the Gulag of A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich could never dream. When being an influence entails comprising, then the church must take a prophetic stance. There are issues on which the church has no dogmatic position (should the capital gains tax be 15% or 20% on securities held over five years but less than ten?). But there are issues where the Church – if it has a public voice, cannot remain silent.

There are issues of wisdom: At what point does one confront the state; at which point should the church retreat? The church in the West (this is not to prioritize the Western church, nor to ignore the very real troubles faced throughout the world; it is simply I know far more about where I live and what I experience than things which I learn secondhand. I simply wish to avoid speaking where beyond what I could reasonably know) is coming to face increasing troubles from a direction it did not expect. 

In the early 20th century, the church on one-side retreated from intellectual engagement with a hostile culture. Another element of the visible compromised. The space of engagement deepened theological positions in many areas and gave us an apologetic and social voice. 

Now we are facing an entirely new challenge for which the church broadly is not ready. Even the previous secular adversaries of the church have little idea on how to respond. But as Rieff noted in connection with Freud’s tame disciples, conflict can deepen and sharpen our thinking. Let’s pray that God gives us the wisdom for our age.

The Conclusion of the Apology of Theophilus of Antioch

18 Saturday May 2019

Posted by in Ante-Nicene, Apologetics, Church History, Uncategorized

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The previous post in this series may be found here. 

Theophilus concludes his defense and advocacy of Christianity by an appeal to (1) its historical veracity; and (2) its antiquity.

He begins this section of the argument as follows:

But I wish now to give you a more accurate demonstration, God helping me, of the historical periods, that you may see that our doctrine is not modern nor fabulous, but more ancient and true than all poets and authors who have written in uncertainty. For some, maintaining that the world was uncreated, went into infinity;1 and others, asserting that it was created, said that already 153, 075 years had passed.

1 i.e., tracing back its history through an infinate duration.

 Theophilus of Antioch, “Theophilus to Autolycus,” in Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria (Entire), ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. Marcus Dods, vol. 2, The Ante-Nicene Fathers (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1885), 116.

Theophilus then works through the then-current theories on the age of the earth, and various events (he spends much time comparing various understandings of the time of the Flood and also the Israelites in Egypt).  In each case, he contends that the Biblical understanding of the time period and events is correct.

First, he goes the basis for the biblical positions:

It behoved, therefore, that he should the rather become a scholar of God in this matter of legislation, as he himself confessed that in no other way could he gain accurate information than by God’s teaching him through the law. And did not the poets Homer and Hesiod and Orpheus profess that they themselves had been instructed by Divine Providence? Moreover, it is said that among your writers there were prophets and prognosticators, and that those wrote accurately: who were informed by them. How much more, then, shall we know the truth who are instructed by the holy prophets, who were possessed by the Holy Spirit of God! On this account all the prophets spoke harmoniously and in agreement with one another, and foretold the things that would come to pass in all the world.

Theophilus of Antioch,  116. That is, since they demonstrated the divine nature of their speech by means of predictive prophecy and coherence in doctrine, they should be trusted when they speak of other things which are far more debated (the ancient history of the world).

He compares the biblical accounts with the accounts of poets and philosophers; for instance:

From what has already been said, it is evident that they who wrote such things and philosophized to so little purpose are miserable, and very profane and senseless persons. But Moses, our prophet and the servant of God, in giving an account of the genesis of the world, related in what manner the flood came upon the earth, telling us, besides, how the details of the flood came about, and relating no fable of Pyrrha nor of Deucalion or Clymenus; nor, forsooth, that only the plains were submerged, and that those only who escaped to the mountains were saved.

Theophilus of Antioch,  116. He then compares the ages of the events set forth in the Bible with the dates for various Greek law givers and poets; and notes that the Biblical account begins before Greek history. This is a relative sort of argument. He does not try to argue that the Biblical accounts go earlier than every other potential account — just earlier than the Greek accounts:

These periods, then, and all the above-mentioned facts, being viewed collectively, one can see the antiquity of the prophetical writings and the divinity of our doctrine, that the doctrine is not recent, nor our tenets mythical and false, as some think, but very ancient and true.

 Theophilus of Antioch,  120. He concludes thus

But the Greeks make no mention of the histories which give the truth: first, because they themselves only recently became partakers of the knowledge of letters; and they themselves own it, alleging that letters were invented, some say among the Chaldæans, and others with the Egyptians, and others again say that they are derived from the Phœnicians. And secondly, because they sinned, and still sin, in not making mention of God, but of vain and useless matters. For thus they most heartily celebrate Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the poets, but the glory of the incorruptible and only God they not only omit to mention, but blaspheme; yes, and they persecuted, and do daily persecute, those who worship Him. And not only so, but they even bestow prizes and honours on those who in harmonious language insult God; but of those who are zealous in the pursuit of virtue and practise a holy life, some they stoned, some they put to death, and up to the present time they subject them to savage tortures. Wherefore such men have necessarily lost the wisdom of God, and have not found the truth.

Theophilus of Antioch, 121. The relative argument is appropriate here, because he is merely contending against a particular man in a particular place. He is not attempting to respond to every possible argument, but he is responding to a particular argument. Why would anyone abandon Helenic Religion and Philosophy for Christianity:

Since, then, my friend, you have assailed me with empty words, boasting of your gods of wood and stone, hammered and cast, carved and graven, which neither see nor hear, for they are idols, and the works of men’s hands; and since, besides, you call me a Christian, as if this were a damning name to bear, I, for my part, avow that I am a Christian,1 and bear this name beloved of God, hoping to be serviceable2 to God. For it is not the case, as you suppose, that the name of God is hard to bear; but possibly you entertain this opinion of God, because you are yourself yet unserviceable to Him.

Theophilus of Antioch, 89. His argument has been to clarify what Christians do believe; and to demonstrate the immorality and absurdity of Greek thought; the elevation of Biblical thought; its morality and antiquity. This argument was antiquity was important in apologetics for the early church. For instance, Clement of Alexandria makes a detailed argument based upon the antiquity of Christianity:

On the plagiarizing of the dogmas of the philosophers from the Hebrews, we shall treat a little afterwards. But first, as due order demands, we must now speak of the epoch of Moses, by which the philosophy of the Hebrews will be demonstrated beyond all contradiction to be the most ancient of all wisdom.

 Clement of Alexandria, “The Stromata, or Miscellanies,” in Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria (Entire), ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, vol. 2, The Ante-Nicene Fathers (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1885), 324.   The idea that the Bible explains the antiquity of original revelation — and a corruption of that revelation as it spreads throughout human history is not merely an argument of the early church, but is a matter of current concern:

In arguing for a revelatory ‘single-source’ theory as to both the theological and historical origin of religion and the religions, does the Urgeschichte provide us with any more detail or explanatory ‘mechanism’ as to the pattern of religion that begins with an original divine disclosure but that, due to human sin, and without divine preservation, ends in a derivative religious degeneration and decay as God ‘gives people over’ to idolatry?

Strange, Daniel. Their Rock Is Not Like Our Rock: A Theology of Religions (pp. 121-122). Zondervan. Kindle Edition. Tracing out that argument is well beyond this post. For now, we only note that the argument from antiquity — with an implicit element of corruption/derivation (Clement’s “plagiarizing”) is still a current concern.

Something new about Shakespeare

27 Wednesday Feb 2019

Posted by in Literature, Uncategorized

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This article in the New York Times describes the work of Dennis McCarthy who used plagiarism software to discover a source mined by Shakespeare. It seems that the Bard used a book by George North, A Brief Discourse on Rebellion and Rebels. The book had been nearly lost to history, when Mr. McCarthy came upon a clue (and you’ll have to read the article yourself to find out how this happened, or everything they discovered).

I liked this bit

One of the most compelling [evidences that Shakespeare used the book] is Jack Cade, who led a failed popular rebellion against Henry VI in 1450. Shakespeare describes Cade’s final days in “Henry VI, Part 2,” in which he says he was starving and eating grass, before he was finally caught and dragged through the street by his heels, his body left to be eaten by crows. Scholars have long thought that Shakespeare invented these details, but all of them are present in a passage from North’s “Discourse” in which he inveighs against Cade and two other famous rebels. Mr. McCarthy and Ms. Schlueter argue that Shakespeare used those details to make Cade into a composite of the three.

What I like about it is how certain scholars can be of a certain “fact” and hold this fact for many, many years — and it turns out that this fact about the most famous writer of the last 1,000 years, whose work has been ransacked for evidence of every thought was wrong. I just wonder how many facts we are certain of which are simply wrong. Our ignorance is proof of our conclusion.

The book itself looks like an interesting read (especially to see how Shakespeare reworked the source material).

A good example of a bad argument (the Judge and the Resurrection)

21 Friday Sep 2018

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I saw this on social media today.  This is good example of misleading argument:

My favorite part of the Kavanaugh controversy is how people who are absolutely convinced they know exactly what happened in Judea 2,000 years ago have gaslit many Americans into believing it is literally impossible to know what happened at an event in 1983.

Here, our correspondent has misstated both the Christian position on the resurrection and the argument respecting an alleged event involving Judge Kavanaugh.

Strawmen.

It is inaccurate to say that anyone is certain of everything which happened in Judea during the life of Jesus. No one claims to have comprehensive knowledge of the time and place. In terms of total facts, far more is unknown than known. The Christian position is that the facts which are known are sufficient to draw certain factual conclusions (such as the Resurrection).

The circumstance involving Judge Kavanaugh differs on the facts available at this time. If the only two facts are one person asserting X and another asserting not-X and there are no other facts, then drawing a conclusion is impossible on that basis alone. The difficulty with Kavanaugh’s case is a lack of a sufficiently detailed allegation (the X, and not-X are not even sufficiently defined) and a lack of evidence beyond the ultimate conclusion.

There are a number of facts which could easily lead to a definite conclusion. For instance, there were a definite statement of date, time and place, one could conclude that the event was more or less probable.

Thus, if the alleged event (again, I have no idea as to the truth, because I do not have a sufficient number of facts from which to draw a conclusion. Anyone who has had access to the publicly available statements “knows” anything is simply wrong.) took place on Date 1 and Kavanaugh was in another Michigan on that date, it is not likely that he took a jet home for this bad act and then returned without notice.

We can look to other corroborating facts: It is reported (goodness knows what has actually been said, this whole story is awash in false statements and nonsense). Are there witnesses? What do they say? Have the witnesses or alleged actors given consistent or inconsistent statements? Etc.

The Resurrection is quite different: it is a conclusion based upon a very definite statement and supported by substantial supporting evidence.

Indeed, the fundamental reason to question the Resurrection is not the evidence but the strangeness of the event. If the Resurrection were a normal historical event, it would be unquestioned.

But what about the passage of years?

As we move further from an event, the number of facts recoverable will lessen. If there are witnesses, the memory of witnesses will fade [I will make a note on eyewitness testimony below.] Witnesses will also become unavailable over the course of time (either through death or becoming lost to interview by moving or whatnot).

Physical facts will also diminish over time (duration will depend upon the nature of the artifact).

How does this not adversely affect the Christian claim?

Christians are not trying to recover facts from 2,000 years. The facts were established and recorded at that time. We are not trying to establish that information today for the first time. The 2,000 years misstates the salient fact of time.

Let’s consider an example: Imagine we have access to a trial transcript from 1940. The events underlying the trial took place one year earlier. If we were to speak of what happened in 1939, the time period between fact and conclusion is 1 year – not 78 years.

In Kavanaugh’s case we are trying to recover facts for the first time 35 years after the event (the 2012 notes are problematic at best. Even the accuser says the notes are wrong).

What about eyewitness testimony? Isn’t it unreliable?

Yes, and no. Eyewitness testimony about stressful events which took place at one time and over a short period of time are very often wrong – often wildly wrong. Crime victims routinely give flawed testimony about the criminal event: they are stressed, confused; their attention is misdirected; they try to reconstruct the event and make numerous errors in the recreation.

The Kavanaugh event concerns eyewitness testimony about an extremely stressful event. An important fact, which may weigh in favor of the accuser is whether she knew Kavanaugh prior to the event. If this was their first (alleged) interaction, she would more easily misidentify him. If they had been friends for years, she does not need to describe his appearance for the first time.

Compare that to testimony about normal events. You know would likely give excellent testimony about the color of your car, the number windows in your bedroom, the number of drawers in your dresser, how often you get paid for work, et cetera. Routine, repeated, normal events are fundamentally different than trying to remember what it was like to be robbed.

On this point, we should note that information obtained in therapy of a long unexpressed painful event which (supposedly) is causing significant bad effects in the present has a reputation for uncovering things which never occurred. Moreover, patients routinely lie to therapists and clients lie to lawyers (I’m not saying always; but it happens enough that it is not a strange thing).

Christianity is based upon claims from multiple witnesses about an event with corroborating physical evidence. For instance, if anyone had been able to produce Jesus’ body in Jerusalem, it would have stopped Christianity at its birth (Crossan’s claim that it was eaten by dogs is silly. Someone could have just said, we say dogs eat it. No one made that claim until Crossan – which a claim which suffers from the 2,000 year distance).

What about prejudice?

The Kavanaugh accusation is a great example of the policy behind Evidence Code section 352. The code essentially forbids the introduction of evidence which would prejudice a juror more than it would inform a juror. For example, let us say the defendant is a gang member charged with a particular crime. In most instances, the jury would never hear about the gang membership. If they heard he was a gang member, they would be more likely to find him guilty because he was in a gang than because he engaged in this particular bad act.

The people who speak confidently about what happened in the Kavanaugh case typically betray a personal prejudice (I was assaulted, therefore, she was telling the truth; I was falsely accused, therefore, she is lying; I hate/adhere to Kavanaugh’s judicial philosophy, therefore, ….).

Most of the people providing their opinion of the event have voiced personal prejudice: their opinion is worthless as to the truth of the accusation.

Well, weren’t the Apostles prejudiced in favor of Jesus? That misstates the issue. They were seriously prejudiced against the possibility of Jesus being resurrected from the dead in the manner in which he did (N.T. Wright’s Resurrection covers the evidence here exhaustively). Their prejudice makes it unlikely they would mistakenly believe Jesus had been resurrected.

What about reputation and motivation?

This does have some bearing. One who has a history of lying, might lie more easily than others. But no amount of lying before proves one is lying as to the instant assertion. No amount of prior conduct proves anything about conduct on one particular instance.

With Kavanaugh, the parties both have strong reasons to tell the truth; and they both have significant motive to lie. In fact, the pressure of examination is likely to cause each party to dig in their heels to insist upon their position (recanting has become more costly than the alternative – especially since the possibility of suffering penalty is minimal in this event). (There are event plausible scenarios under both believe that they are each telling the truth.)

This is a point which weighs very heavily in favor of the apostolic witness. They all suffered greatly (most often to death) for their testimony.

But don’t people die for false believes all the time?Yes, but that isn’t the case here.

Consider three scenarios:

1) Alleged Historical Event Z – never happened.

2) P1 who relates Z to P2.

3) P1 has lied to P2.

4) P2 believes P1

5) P2 dies based upon the false belief related by P1.

 

1) Historical Event Z.

2) Witnessed by P1.

3) P1 knows, based upon personal experience that Z took place.

4) P1 dies for Z.

 

1) Alleged Historical Event Z.

2) P1 knows it never happened.

3) P1 claims that Z happened.

4) P1 is challenged with death over Z.

5) P1 personally knows that Z is false.

6) P1 recants to stay alive.

People will recant things they believe to be true to save their life. It would be a remarkable day indeed for someone to go to death for a fact which they personally knew was false.

Conclusion

In conclusion, an analogy between Judge Kavanaugh’s circumstance and the Resurrection is poorly drawn.

As for the Judge and his accuser. I honestly have no definite idea what happened. I am not even certain what facts and accusation have been established. I have read any number of assertions made confidentially by people who are in no position to know any more than I do. I have seen a great deal of gossip, slander and vicious stupidity. (Apparently, there have been significant death threats made against almost everyone involved.)

I have seen that bias and prejudice have more importance than any consideration of evidence (not to say burden of proof — which is critical in this instance).

This political tempest is very sad; it has often been wicked; and I fear no matter how it ends, the result will be a further deterioration of our social fabric.

Selling a Child: Exodus 21:7

30 Thursday Aug 2018

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This is a verse in the Bible which is used routinely to taunt believers: the Bible says you can sell you child as a slave:

7 And if a man sell his daughter to be a maidservant, she shall not go out as the menservants do.

Exodus 21:7(AV).  Newer translations have the word “slave” in place of maidservant.  For instance, the television show the West Wing, the President character says: “I’m interested in selling my youngest daughter into slavery as sanctioned in Exodus 21 : 7. She’s a Georgetown sophomore, speaks fluent Italian, always cleared the table when it was her turn. What would a good price for her be?”

Admittedly, selling a child sounds horrible to an affluent, well fed family. So let’s think about this for a moment: if we assume that Israelites loved their children as much as we do, we must assume that sending a child out of the home would be only undertaken in the most extraordinary circumstances.

Remember that there was no welfare state at that time. Most people lived in subsistence agriculture. The threat of starvation was real and likely constant.

But someone will say, that is just unrealistic; that does not happen. But today I read this:

Julian Pitt-Rivers, a British anthropologist who published a classic study of a traditional Andalusian community in the early 1950s, wrote that it was common in the rural south for children from impoverished families to be sent to the mountains to look after sheep and goats in exchange for money.

Let us consider again the passage in Exodus 21:7. First, we must remember that the covenant promised material wealth — if the people of Israel fulfilled their requirements under the covenant. Thus, poverty was the result of sin. We must also realize that there was a framework of kinship and other mechanisms built into the law to prevent poverty. Thus, for any family to become so destitute that Exodus 21:7 was a reality spoke to a serious degradation of society overall.

The law was not given to save anyone-Israel was never a kingdom of saints. The Bible makes it plain the people were repeatedly in vicious, sinful rebellion.

Next consider that the purpose of the passage is not approve or condone selling one’s children as slaves/servants (in a subsistence economy even the well-off live miserable lives). The purpose of the law was alleviate the damage which could come even in this wretched state. This passage is a matter of protection, a command to stop the sin and brutality. It was a limitation not a grant of authority.

Theophilus of Antioch: This is What We Believe and Do

03 Friday Aug 2018

Posted by in Ante-Nicene, Church History, Uncategorized

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The previous summary of Theophilus may be found here.

Having responded to the accusations of Christians by first noting what the pagans actually espouse, Theophilus turns to what Christians actually believe and espouse. He begins with the law:

Now we also confess that God exists, but that He is one, the creator, and maker, and fashioner of this universe; and we know that all things are arranged by His providence, but by Him alone. And we have learned a holy law; but we have as lawgiver Him who is really God, who teaches us to act righteously, and to be pious, and to do good.

Theophilus of Antioch, “Theophilus to Autolycus,” in Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria (Entire), ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. Marcus Dods, vol. 2, The Ante-Nicene Fathers (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1885), 113–114. In the following words, he lays out a summary of the Ten Commandments together with a brief summary of the giving of the law.

Next he notes that Christians have an obligation to care for the stranger, “Ye shall not afflict a stranger; for ye know the heart of a stranger: for yourselves were strangers in the land of Egypt.” Christians have the need to repent — which is a grace given by God. Christians must live lives of chastity. In these ways, Christians are very counter-cultural; for even those who seem to espouse such tremendous concerns of immigrants don’t really have a record of living among those people. I suspect that for many immigrants are merely a pawn or a weapon in a political calculation.

His summary of the Christian life includes a discussion of righteousness. This section is interesting at the present time as Christians debate the matter of “social justice”. It is interesting to note the ways in which his summary draws on some of the concerns of our time and yet does not follow our current concerns. Since it is timely, I will quote it at length:

Moreover, concerning the righteousness which the law enjoined, confirmatory utterances are found both with the prophets and in the Gospels, because they all spoke inspired by one Spirit of God. Isaiah accordingly spoke thus: “Put away the evil of your doings from your souls; learn to do well, seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow.” And again the same prophet said: “Loose every band of wickedness, dissolve every oppressive contract, let the oppressed go free, and tear up every unrighteous bond. Deal out thy bread to the hungry, and bring the houseless poor to thy home. When thou seest the naked, cover him, and hide not thyself from thine own flesh. Then shall thy light break forth as the morning, and thine health shall spring forth speedily, and thy righteousness shall go before thee.”1 In like manner also Jeremiah says: “Stand in the ways, and see, and ask which is the good way of the LORD your God, and walk in it and ye shall find rest for your souls. Judge just judgment, for in this is the will of the LORD your God.” So also says Hosea: “Keep judgment, and draw near to your God, who established the heavens and created the earth.” And another, Joel, spoke in agreement with these: “Gather the people, sanctify the congregation, assemble the elders, gather the children that are in arms; let the bridegroom go forth of his chamber, and the bride out of her closet, and pray to the LORD thy God urgently that he may have mercy upon you, and blot out your sins.” In like manner also another, Zachariah: “Thus saith the LORD Almighty, Execute true judgment, and show mercy and compassion every man to his brother; and oppress not the widow, nor the fatherless, nor the stranger; and let none of you imagine evil against his brother in your heart, saith the LORD Almighty.”

What I find most interesting in Theophilus’s defense of Christianity on this point is that it does not draw on anything from his culture. While he is engaging his world, he is not using the then-current culture to support his position. It is simply, this is what we are.

And so he summarizes his defense as to what Christians supposedly do and say:

But far be it from Christians to conceive any such deeds; for with them temperance dwells, self-restraint is practised, monogamy is observed, chastity is guarded, iniquity exterminated, sin extirpated, righteousness exercised, law administered, worship performed, God acknowledged: truth governs, grace guards, peace screens them; the holy word guides, wisdom teaches, life directs, God reigns. Therefore, though we have much to say regarding our manner of life, and the ordinances of God, the maker of all creation, we yet consider that we have for the present reminded you of enough to induce you to study these things, especially since you can now read [our writings] for yourself, that as you have been fond of acquiring information, you may still be studious in this direction also.