Tag Archives: Common Grace

Kuyper on Common Grace 1.13 All life is grace.

04 Monday May 2020

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In chapter 13, Kuyper begins to specifically develop the doctrine of common grace. He notes that while the operation of common grace changed in the post-flood world, the fact of such grace – grace to preserve life rather than redeem from sin – was not new with Noah. He places the advent of such grace with the startling fact from Genesis 3 that Adam did not immediately die upon committing the transgression.

Kuyper then draws this conclusion, “If common grace is the means whereby Adam’s presence on this earth was unexpectedly extended, then it follows that your own life, your birth, your existence as a human being arises not merely from creation, but is an act that is rooted in grace.” (113). Kuyper puts this observation most plainly in the context of Adam’s continued existence, but the proposition holds true for all persons. Our existence, today, is the result of common grace, for all are under the sentence of death.

This seems perhaps more plainly true when the idea of death is so patently on the minds of all. A politician was giving himself and his efforts great credit for what was claimed to be a reduction in death. This unnamed politician (and perhaps not one you suspected), claimed this was not God, it was our work.

Yes, there are secondary causes. And yes humans have real agency. But, our continued existence while we live under a curse is purely a matter of grace.

Kuyper on Common Grace.12 (The Change at the Flood)

24 Friday Apr 2020

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Abraham Kuyper, Common Grace 12

In this chapter, Kuyper details both the continuities and the distinctions which take place before and after the Flood. Kuyper’s understanding of common grace underscores his understanding of the flood.

First, the fact of saving the entire human race – even though the race only consisted of one family – was an act of common, not special grace. Eternal salvation was not conveyed, only temporal. Moreover, it was not only human beings but animals and plants which were saved. Thus, it was common to all living creatures on the planet.

It is not that the church was saved in order to abandon everything outside the church to general ruin. But the grace shown here extends to the entirety of human life. Most surely the purpose was so that God’s church could find a place to set its foot, and also so that the church of the new covenant would gather together believers from all peoples and nations. But its purpose was also so that in a proper sense God the Lord would continue his work in that broad sphere of human life, not unto the saving of souls but no less unto the praise and glory of his great name.

Abraham Kuyper, Common Grace: God’s Gifts for a Fallen World: The Historical Section, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, Melvin Flikkema, and Stephen J. Grabill, trans. Nelson D. Kloosterman and Ed M. van der Maas, vol. 1, Abraham Kuyper Collected Works in Public Theology (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press; Acton Institute, 2015), 107.

Second, Kuyper notes some distinct physical discontinuities which took place at the Flood. The globe itself was changed, ground and atmosphere. The relationship between human and animals changed.

The nature of human life likewise changed. Following the flood, human life span significantly decreased. A fascinating observation, which is wholly consistent with this observation, is the problem of genetic entropy.

Kuyper explains this decrease in lifespan as a blessing because it limited the ability of the wicked to increase in skill. Likewise, the elect no longer need wait eight centuries until they can be with the Lord.

This new state of affairs would maintain regularly until the return of the Lord. And in this state of common grace, with the reordering of the world, the change in the relationship to the natural world, the decrease in life span as well as the institution of government, would permit the continued existence of the human race for the ultimate benefit of the Church and God’s glory.

Abraham Kuyper, Common Grace.11 (The legitimacy of government)

16 Thursday Apr 2020

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The previous post on this book by Kuypermay be found here:

Chapter 11 concerns the basis for the institution of government.  It is Kuyper’s contention that Genesis 9:6 forms the basis for the institution of government among human beings:

Genesis 9:6 (ESV)

6           “Whoever sheds the blood of man,

by man shall his blood be shed,

for God made man in his own image.

The argument proceeds as follows. First, Kuyper disposes of the three common theories for the institution of government. In this, he is looking for a moral justification, a moral legitimacy for government.

He begins with the age-old government by conquest: someone uses forces to kill and steal and by violence controls some territory and human beings. For as long as the conqueror maintains power, he maintains his position. After many years, the conquest becomes tradition and the murder is crowned with legitimacy. He notes the irony of giving a reward for murder for the sake of theft.  This is not real justice but rather a reward for sin.  And so, this cannot be a firm basis for true legitimacy in power.

Second, he considers the “social contract” theory: a group of free individuals contract with one another for the creation of the government. The sovereignty resides in the “people” who freely enter into a new arrangement. This runs into two problems: One, the initial social contracting event never took place. Two, even if such did happen, the contract has no power bind the children of these people who will then their own sovereign right to reject their parents’ decisions.

Third, there is the possibility of spontaneous design: governments just happen. And while this does take, it is an immoral pantheistic understanding of moral order. It is irrelevant how the government comes to be; only, it just does come to be.

None of these theories meet the moral case. Rather, Kuyper roots the fact of government in the common grace of God.

His construction of this argument is based upon the principle that authority derives solely from God:

We urgently request our readers to place all the requisite emphasis on this. The one true position that Scripture points out to us is that as people we by nature have authority over nothing. All authority belongs to God and God alone. All things belong to him and nothing to you. You have no authority over anything, no matter what it might be, unless God grants you this authority. (98)

Using the chapters of Genesis, he then lays out places were God grants authority to human beings: authority over the animals, authority to eat plants and later to eat animals, and so forth. He contrasts this with God’s withholding of authority to eat from the tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.

The fact that there are any government lies in the delegation of God’s authority in some measure to human beings. Governments are things ultimately appointed by God:

Romans 13:1 (ESV)

Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God.

This does not mean that all authorities in existence are good, moral or right. But it does mean that as part of God’s common grace he has bestowed government into the world as a thing which can come into existence.

There are other questions, not addressed by Kuyper at this point, concerning the right use of that authority.

He then lays the original institution of the fact of human government into the world at Genesis 9:6.

There are two ways to understand God’s grant of authority in these instances. First, a grant of authority could merely be a matter of permission. For example God tells Adam that you may eat from this tree but not that tree. Adam has the physical ability to defy the law and to exceed the grant of authority. Whether Adam abides by the grant of authority.

A second way to understand the grant of authority to understand it as not merely permission but also possibility. When God grants dominion to Adam and Eve in creation, he did not merely grant permission but in the grant made the matter so.

Kuyper confesses the possibility that some sort of government may have existed prior to the Flood; but if it did so, it did so without a basis in a grant from God. The exercise of such authority would be similar to the rebellion in the Garden.

 

Kuyper, Common Grace 1.10

09 Monday Dec 2019

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The prior post in this series may be found here.

In Chapter 10, Kuyper considers the issue of governmental legitimacy. The question of legitimacy is of great importance in the matter of government. If a government is legitimate, then the population willing submits to the government and the government rightfully enacts and enforces law.

Most people never consider the basis for legitimacy; rather, we all just know that a government is legitimate or not. For example, in a monarchy, everyone knows that the child of the sovereign is the next sovereign. In a democracy, everyone knows that the winner of a popularity contest may enact law. In both cases, everyone knows that some random crank who declares himself sovereign – even with an elaborate ceremony – is just a crank and not a king.

Conversely, if everyone in a nation were to suddenly know that the leadership was illegitimate, the government would then be nothing other than bandits and tyrants.

How then does legitimacy come to be?

Kuyper considers and rejects three theories of legitimacy. First there the right of a conqueror. At the beginning, a conqueror’s power maintains as long as he is able to maintain sufficient military might to quell any opposition. However, after some time, the duration of rule itself becomes the legitimatizing basis of rule. The trouble here is moral: we don’t forgive a murderer because he murdered to rob and then was able to hold off anyone who attempted to prosecute him for his murder and robbery. Indeed, such a man would be considered peculiarly evil.

A second theory is the “social contract” model: whereby initially free people contract to form a government which has legitimate power based upon the concession of others. A primary trouble here is that such a claim is based upon a fiction: no such universal contractual decision has ever been undertaken by previously unruled individuals.

A third theory looks to spontaneous ordering: such spontaneous development theories appear more factual than the other theories: but this theory too appears as morally questionable. Kuyper raises two objections: (1) The theory cannot distinguish between a morally good and a morally bad order: cruelty and deceit or heroism and virtue could each lead to an actual government of some sort.

(2) Kuyper explains that such a theory is pantheistic: Rather than government be a determined act of God; authority would be something inherent in all that is. Thus, might would be right, because it is.

Having rejected these alternatives, Kuyper explains that what government does itself must be the result of a gracious act of God: not a peculiar saving grace, such as shown to the elect; but, a “common grace” to order the world in such a manner as to limit the effective scope of sin.

Thus, there is the effectuation of a government and the providential placement of a leader in position. Kuyper then explains the basis of legitimacy: if the leader and the populace both accede that God has created the structure, the structure is and all “are accountable to God for the things they know they have done for or against that authority.” Abraham Kuyper, Common Grace: God’s Gifts for a Fallen World: The Historical Section, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, Melvin Flikkema, and Stephen J. Grabill, trans. Nelson D. Kloosterman and Ed M. van der Maas, vol. 1, Abraham Kuyper Collected Works in Public Theology (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press; Acton Institute, 2015), 95–96.

How then is this authority known? It can only come from God, because humans by nature have authority over nothing. The authority granted in Genesis 1 is granted by God: it is not inherent in the creature. God had the authority to grant or forbid the Adam to eat of trees in the Garden – and the authority over all other actions of Adam.

Not having even the least of authority, we certain have no authority by nature over one-another. Kuyper concedes that some sort of pre-Flood governmental authority must have arisen; but such authority would have existed without divine sanction.

Kuyper, Common Grace, 1.9

26 Tuesday Nov 2019

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The prior post may be found here.

In this chapter, Kuyper considers the issue of whether Genesis 9:6 provides the basis for imposition of civil government:

Genesis 9:6 (AV)

6Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man.

The argument is essentially this: The primary (and ultimate) act of the civil government is the enforcement of law, by the (ultimate) act of capital punishment. See, Romans 13:1, et seq.

It is the Reformed position that the right of capital punishment conveys the power of civil government. However, there are those who hold that this verse is not a command but rather a promise of punishment by God on the last day, or perhaps God in providence will provide for an untimely death of the miscreant. And while the Reformed position would agree that God will punish on the Last Day, and that providence may provide for the untimely death of the murderer, the quotation is in the form of an imperative: Thou shalt punish the murderer.

But is this the correct understanding? Are those who refuse the imperative more accurate?

Kuyper begins by assessing the structure of the proposition: He notes that the final clause is explanatory: “for in the image of God made he man.”

What conclusion should we draw from this: Does the taking of the murder’s life rest upon the dignity of the victim? Or does the right to impose capital punishment rest upon the dignity of man to be a judge of such things (in accord with God’s direction)?

We must realize that all created things belong to God, and human beings have no independent position to exercise any dominion over any creature – except as God ordains. This is inherent in the Genesis 1 creation account of human beings: to be created in God’s image & to exercise dominion over creation were two distinct propositions:

Genesis 1:26–28 (AV)

[First] 26 And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. 27 So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them.

[Second] 28 And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.

Thus, no one human being has the right to take another human being’s life without express direction from God.

When we consider this proposition it helps to decide between the two possible readings of the concluding clause of Genesis 9: being in the image of God could not give a human being the right to kill another human. But, killing a human being would give us a rationale for God’s ordinance of capital punishment: it is correct because a human being has been killed.

The ordinance rests ultimately upon God’s sovereignty. God alone has the right and power to impose such a rule. Anyone who kills without God’s mandate, makes himself liable to being executed by other men. The judicial motive of the act is the honor and sovereignty of God. This then makes sense of the whole.

Exodus 21:12 (AV)

He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put to death.

Kuyper makes an interesting observation about the sound of the first clause of Genesis 9:6. The sound “dam” means blood in Hebrew. The sound a-dam means human being, man. Thus, the clause sounds like this: dam ha’adam ba’adam damo. There is a fourfold repetition of the sound for blood.

He ends with an interesting observation about authority. Prior to this institution, there was authority within the family – but this included no authority to take a life. Here we have something new, and with that the post-flood world included the institution of a civil government.

 

 

 

 

 

Abraham Kuyper, Common Grace 1.8

04 Friday Oct 2019

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This chapter concerns Genesis 9:6

Whoever sheds the blood of man,

by man shall his blood be shed,

for God made man in his own image

The first issue he considers is whether statement is the institution of capital punishment by a government, or merely an observation that private vendetta will occur. He considers the objection of Professor Mr. J. Domela Nieuwenhuis who argued tha statement was a concession to ancient cultural norms, which has no continuing significance for us living after Jesus.

Kuyer first rests upon the general principle in the Reformed Tradition that the moral content of the law remains intact, even if the culture for the moral principle works out has changed: “That form has now passed away, but that principle has remained, and we continue to be bound only to those principles, since they have been established by God.”

Addressing the argument from the Sermon on the Mount where Jesus argues, You have heard, but I say: Kuyper explains that Jesus does not disagree with the Mosaic Law, but rather the traditional gloss which had been placed upon the Law. Kuyper also notes that the Old Testament provides evidence that one is to love one’s enemy. See, e.g., Prov. 25:21, “If your enemy is hungry, give him bread to eat, and if he is thirsty, give him water to drink.”

Kuyper then returns to the interpretation of the 9:6, is this a command or a concession? To answer that question, he returns to the context:

Genesis 9:5–6 (ESV)

5 And for your lifeblood I will require a reckoning: from every beast I will require it and from man. From his fellow man I will require a reckoning for the life of man.

6    “Whoever sheds the blood of man,

by man shall his blood be shed,

       for God made man in his own image.

Verse five states that God will require a reckoning for murder “I will require a reckoning for the life of a man”. Verse six then specifies the manner by which this reckoning will be made, “by man shall his blood be shed”.

But that alone does not settle the issue: does the verse meant that this will be the normal course of events or is this a command to institute capital punishment?

Kuyper sees the critical element here being the basis for the command: “For God made man in his own image.” If this was merely an observation, then the basis for the proposition does not follow.

Consider:

Whoever sheds the blood of man,

by man shall his blood be shed,

Why?

Because people normally take revenge. Because people are sinful and not forgiving. Because that is just what will happen.

Instead, the basis for the statement is God’s action in creating human beings in the image of God. God will require a reckoning, because human beings are in God’s image. The movement of the argument controls the understanding of “by man shall his blood be shed.” In context, this is what must happen, because of God’s honor. The obligation to perform the act is independent of human motivation: it both requires and limits conduct.

Kuyper, Common Grace 1.7

19 Thursday Sep 2019

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In the seventh chapter of Common Grace, Kuyper comes to:

5 And for your lifeblood I will require a reckoning:

from every beast I will require it

and from man.

From his fellow man I will require a reckoning

for the life of man.

Genesis 9:5 (ESV)

First, the verse concerns God’s “reckoning”; not human reckoning (that comes in verse 6).

Second, God will judge the killing of a human being.

This judgment is apart from capital punishment and human government, which dealt with in verse 6.

He lists three ways in which God will deal with the human murderer: (1) conscience; (2) providential punishment (the way in which the murderer’s life will play out will provide a punishment); (3) eternal punishment.

A temporal punishment, such as conscience and providence which leads to repentance would be a grace. To not be lead to repentance but rather suffer eternal punishment is a far greater act of justice and retribution than any temporal response.

Third, God will require a reckoning from both predatory animals and from human beings.

Fourth, he notes a distinction made between the acts of animals and humans. In the first sentence, God notes especially the shedding of blood. This applies to both animals and humans. But in the parallel verse, which pertains only to human beings, God speaks of taking the “life”, the nephesh, which also means the soul of a human being.

The reason for this distinction lies in the fact that a human being does not kill for “blood” (eating) in the way an animal does. A human kills to take a life. God will require blood from the animal, but a life from the human.

Fifth, on question as to the extent of the flood, he offers this explanation. The “whole world” is used in various senses and must be read in context. Thus, “The whole world has gone after him” (John 12:19) does not mean every human being in the world, but only those who have come into contact with him.

 

The contextual use of the phrase “the whole world” in the Flood Narrative is difficult to determine. It unquestionably means a flood sufficient to kill all human beings: that is apparent from the direct purpose of the narrative. Whether the narrative demands that portions of the earth uninhabited by human beings was also flooded is more difficult to establish. It could mean that the entire globe was awash. But there is room for debate on the interpretation.

Kuyper on Common Grace 1.6

04 Wednesday Sep 2019

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The previous post in this series may be found here. 

Genesis 9:3–5 (ESV)

3 Every moving thing that lives shall be food for you. And as I gave you the green plants, I give you everything. 4 But you shall not eat flesh with its life, that is, its blood. 5 And for your lifeblood I will require a reckoning: from every beast I will require it and from man. From his fellow man I will require a reckoning for the life of man.

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Goya, Three Salmon Steaks

In chapter six, Kuyper considers the provisions of the Noahic covenant which pertain to the relationship between animals and human beings. He will conclude that the primary basis for this command is to erect a clear demarcation between human beings and animals.

First, human beings may animals as well as plants.

Second, human beings must be distinguished from animals, in that we will not eat living animals. In distinction from animals and in reverence to God, the animal must first be dead before it may be eaten.

Third, animals are not given the equivalent right to eat human beings.

Some further observations.

Three points of elaboration.

Kuyper notes the Noahic covenant has no foreshadowing of the New Covenant in the way the Mosaic Covenant points forward to the coming Messiah. He refers to the Mosaic Covenant as being a covenant of shadows – and that the foreshadowing did not start until the giving of circumcision and the coming of Israel.

As to killing animals, he contends rightly that this is a provision of the Noahic covenant – it is not based upon the creation order.  Kuyper notes how we naturally revolt against killing animals – it takes some to overcome that hesitancy.

Kuyper also infers a high degree of barbarism in the pre-flood world, such that limitations on tearing animals in the manner of beasts and restrictions on cannibalism were necessary as a common grace restraint.

He notes that by requiring the life to depart to God who gave it, we are giving deference to God in the taking of the animal. Calvin, who informs a great deal of Kuyper’s thought on this subject writes in his commentary:

This ought justly to be deemed by us of greater importance, that to eat the flesh of animals is granted to us by the kindness of God; that we do not seize upon what our appetite desires, as robbers do, nor yet tyrannically shed the innocent blood of cattle; but that we only take what is offered to us by the hand of the Lord. We have heard what Paul says, that we are at liberty to eat what we please, only we do it with the assurance of conscience, but that he who imagines anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean, (Romans 14:14.) And whence has this happened to man, that he should eat whatever food he pleased before God, with a tranquil mind, and not with unbridled license, except from his knowing, that it has been divinely delivered into his hand by the right of donation? Wherefore, (the same Paul being witness,) the word of God sanctifies the creatures, that we may purely and lawfully feed on them, (1 Timothy 4:5.) Let the adage be utterly rejected which says,‘that no one can feed and refresh his body with a morsel of bread, without, at the same time, defiling his soul.’Therefore it is not to be doubted, that the Lord designed to confirm our faith, when he expressly declares by Moses, that he gave to man the free use of flesh, so that we might not eat it with a doubtful and trembling conscience. At the same time, however, he invites us to thanksgiving. On this account also, Paul adds “prayer” to the “word”, in defining the method of sanctification in the passage recently cited.

John Calvin, Genesis, electronic ed., Calvin’s Commentaries, 1998, Ge 9:3.

 

Kuyper, Common Grace 1.4

05 Monday Aug 2019

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In this chapter Kuyper underscores a few points: While God had displayed grace toward humanity immediately after the Fall (a point he will develop at length later in the book), that grace was limited. What God did do was permit human beings to live out the implications of their rebellion until the “earth was filled with violence” (Gen. 6:11) [It strangely seems lost upon humanity that violence is evidence of God’s wrath against sin, because God is not restraining sin. Sin is its own punishment and carries within it, its own sorrow. No matter its original appearance, its trajectory is always the same.]

But at the point of Noah, God imposed a new order upon the world: the physical world would never again be such that a universal flood could occur; the animal world changed and the relationship to animals. Importantly, God also acted to restrain certain temporal aspects of sin. God acted to restrain sin: not fully; but he would to permit it to unleash itself upon the world in full furry until the time of the Son of Perdition.

The rainbow was marked as the sign of the covenant (the bow being a war bow, as in bow and arrow).

This points to the spiritual aspect of this covenant which on its face concerns only physical concerns. The covenant as in place to preserve humanity. The purpose of this covenant, lies “with the elect.”

There has been a failure to consider the significance of this covenant, even among theologians and preachers.

Kuyper Common Grace 1.3

31 Wednesday Jul 2019

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The prior post in this series is found here.

In this chapter, Kuyper takes upon the scope of the Noah covenant: was it with the “church” alone, or was it common to all? First, Kuyer relies heavily upon Calvin’s commentary on Genesis 9, wherein Calvin writes that it was a broad, common covenant with human beings and animals:

Moreover, there is no doubt that it was the design of God to provide for all his posterity. It was not therefore a private covenant confirmed with one family only, but one which is common to all people, and which shall flourish in all ages to the end of the world. And truly, since at the present time, impiety overflows not less than in the age of Noah, it is especially necessary that the waters should be restrained by this word of God, as by a thousand bolts and bars lest they should break forth to destroy us. Wherefore, relying on this promise, let us look forward to the last day, in which the consuming fire shall purify heaven and earth.

10. And with every living creature. Although the favor which the Lord promises extends also to animals, yet it is not in vain that he addresses himself only to men, who, by the sense of faith, are able to perceive this benefit. We enjoy the heaven and the air in common with the beasts, and draw the same vital breath; but it is no common privilege, that God directs his word to us; whence we may learn with what paternal love he pursues us. And here three distinct steps are to be traced. First, God, as in a matter of present concern, makes a covenant with Noah and his family, lest they should be afraid of a deluge for themselves. Secondly, he transmits his covenant to posterity, not only that, as by continual succession, the effect may reach to other ages; but that they who should afterwards be born might also apprehend this testimony by faith, and might conclude that the same thing which had been promised to the sons of Noah, was promised unto them. Thirdly, he declares that he will be propitious also to brute animals, so that the effect of the covenant towards them, might be the preservation of their lives only, without imparting to them sense and intelligence.

John Calvin, Genesis, electronic ed., Calvin’s Commentaries, 1998, Ge 9:8–10. He then makes the observation that God would not again destroy the world by flood.

This raises the question: Why was the world destroyed by flood? Because human beings had become insufferably wicked and destructive that there would be no place for God’s redemptive work. Therefore, God rescues Noah and begins anew. But this time, rather than provide a “redemption” by flood, God will preserve a place for his redemptive work by means of restraint of sin:

that the restraining power proceeding from common grace against sin, has become increased from God’s side after the flood. The beast within man remains just as evil and wild, but the bars around its cage were fortified, so that it cannot again escape like it used to.

 Abraham Kuyper, Common Grace: God’s Gifts for a Fallen World: The Historical Section, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, Melvin Flikkema, and Stephen J. Grabill, trans. Nelson D. Kloosterman and Ed M. van der Maas, vol. 1, Abraham Kuyper Collected Works in Public Theology (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press; Acton Institute, 2015), 26.

The basic structure and purpose of “common grace” is not and never was to redeem human beings from, but to restrain the outbursts of sin to preserve a humanity for God’s redemptive work. Common grace is a fence which limits the ravages of the curse and sin.