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A Short Summary of the Majority Opinion in Dobbs

24 Friday Jun 2022

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I have tried to track the Dobbs decision, laying out the structure of the argument. I did omit the final section of the opinion where the majority opinion responded to certain issues in the concurrence and dissent. (I got tired) This is not a critique of the decision, just an attempt to track the argument as it stands. The majority opinion with appendix is 117 pages long.

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

I.               INTRODUCTION

A.             Social/Political Setting for the Decision:

“Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently that a human person comes into being at conception and that abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman’s right to control her own body and prevents women from achieving full equality. Still others in a third group think that abortion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of views about the particular restrictions that should be imposed.”

B.             Legal Setting for this Decision:

1.              Roe in context: “For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitution, each State was permitted to address this issue in accordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this Court decided Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113.”

A.             Summary of Roe:

“Even though the Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held that it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim that American law or the common law had ever recognized such a right, and its survey of history ranged from the constitutionally irrelevant (e.g., its discussion of abortion in an-tiquity) to the plainly incorrect (e.g., its assertion that abortion was probably never a crime under the common law). After cataloging a wealth of other information having no bearing on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion concluded with a numbered set of rules much like those that might be found in a statute enacted by a legislature.”

1.              Note: This a summary of the basic argument which will follow.

a. First, Roe was wrong because Roe “found” a right which does not exist on the face of the Constitution. This is agreed by all: there is no express right to abortion in the Constitution.

Second, Roe was wrong to find an implied right. Implied rights are generally rights which existed previously in the history of American or English Common Law (the American Constitution being written in the context of English Common.” Reviewing the evidence for an implied right will take up much of the opinion.

B.             Summary of the Holding  and Subsequent History of Roe

1.  Roe set out three chronological time periods for regulation of abortion. This three time-periods system will be set aside in Casey around 20 years later.

2. Roe was an exercise of legislative power in the guise of judicial interpretation (this is not quite how the argument is made but it seems to be the underlying thinking of the opinion) “Justice Byron White aptly put it in his dissent, the decision represented the “exercise of raw judicial power,” 410 U. S., at 222, and it sparked a national controversy that has embittered our political culture for a half century.”

C.              Another Case Brings Up Roe

1.              As if proof that Casey did not create the ease on political conflict that the drafters wished, we have this Mississippi law.

2.              On one side, we are asked to overturn Roe.

3.              On the other side, we are asked to reaffirm Roe & Case.

D.             Holding

                  There are two parts to a decision:  a “holding” and “dicta.” Holding is the ruling: You win or lose. Dicta is the reasoning which leads to the decision.

1.              “We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled.” Since Roe & Casey are overturned, the Mississippi law does not violate the constitution.

2.              Summary of the rationale. The court explains that a “right” must be either explicit in the text of the constitution or implicit in the history of law in which the Constitution was written:

“The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s his- tory and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).”

“The right to abortion does not fall within this category. Until the latter part of the 20th century, such a right was entirely unknown in American law. Indeed, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, three quarters of the States made abortion a crime at all stages of pregnancy.”

3.              Note on “implicit” rights.

An obvious question would be, what does the history matter if it is not expressly written down in the text of the law? When something is a given in a particular historical setting, there is no need to make any explicit statement concerning it: It is something everyone knows.  How many descriptions have seen written out on to turn on a television, or how to dress for a baseball game. But if you were to be invited for dinner or a party at the house of someone whom you had never met, you would ask for explicit directions on how to dress.

The law addresses things which are unclear. But if the concept is well-known, there is no need to be explicit.

The 14th Amendment explains that no one may be deprive of their life, liberty, or property “without due process of law.” Due process refers to the sort of procedures used to find someone guilty of a crime (for instance). The drafters did not need to explain, you have to have a judge when you have a trial. Everyone “knew” due process at least includes a judge. Use of a judge is implied in “due process.”

E.              But Stare Decisis

There is a second question for the Court. Maybe Roe & Casey have some problems, but when the Court makes a decision, the decision should stand and control future decisions. If it is decided, it is decided. This is generally a good rule; no one wants the law to change helter-skelter. We need regularity to be able to lead our lives and conduct business.

1. The question of whether the doctrine of stare decisis should prevent overturning Roe and Casey will occupy a significant portion of the decision. But as the Court summarizes here, 5 justices (Justice Roberts agreed that the Mississippi law was constitutional; but he said that we don’t need to overturn Roe to upload this law; and so he agreed with the majority that the law was constitutional; he disagreed about overturning Roe).

2.  “Roe was egregiously wrong from the start. Its reasoning was exceptionally weak, and the decision has had damaging consequences. And far from bringing about a national settlement of the abortion issue, Roe and Casey have enflamed debate and deepened division.” Notice the two arguments: (a) Roe used bad logic; (b) Roe & Casey have caused political conflict.

II.             SUMMARY

A.              Sets out the law, the legislative findings, and the parties.

B.              The issue, the question the Court will decide:

“We granted certiorari, 593 U. S. ___ (2021), to resolve the question whether “all previability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional,” Pet. for Cert. i. Petitioners’ primary defense of the Mississippi Gestational Age Act is that Roe and Casey were wrongly decided and that “the Act is constitutional because it satisfies rational-basis re- view.” Brief for Petitioners 49. Respondents answer that allowing Mississippi to ban pre-viability abortions “would be no different than overruling Casey and Roe entirely.” Brief for Respondents 43. They tell us that “no half- measures” are available: We must either reaffirm or overrule Roe and Casey. Brief for Respondents 50.”

C.              Summary of the Court’s analysis:

1. “First, we explain the standard that our cases have used in determining whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s reference to “liberty” protects a particular right.”

2.  “Second, we examine whether the right at issue in this case is rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition and whether it is an essential component of what we have described as “ordered liberty.””

3. “Finally, we consider whether a right to obtain an abortion is part of a broader entrenched right that is supported by other precedents.”

4.              Why are you relying upon an analysis of whether abortion is an “implicit right”?

“Constitutional analysis must begin with “the language of the instrument,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 186–189 (1824), which offers a “fixed standard” for ascertaining what our founding document means, 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §399, p. 383 (1833). The Constitution makes no express reference to a right to obtain an abortion, and therefore those who claim that it protects such a right must show that the right is somehow implicit in the constitutional text.”

5.              Summary of the sort of arguments which have been used to find an “implicit right”.

There have been three basic places where parties have argued that the implicit right could be found, based upon certain provisions of the constitution:

“The Court’s discussion left open at least three ways in which some combination of these provisions could protect the abortion right.

“[1] One possibility was that the right was “founded . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people.” Id., at 153.

“[2] Another was that the right was rooted in the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendment, or in some combination of those provisions, and that this right had been “incorporated” into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment just as many other Bill of Rights provisions had by then been incorporated. Ibid; see also McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 763–766 (2010) (majority opinion) (discussing incorporation).

“[3] And a third path was that the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments played no role and that the right was simply a component of the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Roe, 410 U. S., at 153. Roe expressed the “feel[ing]” that the Fourteenth Amendment was the provision that did the work, but its message seemed to be that the abortion right could be found somewhere in the Constitution and that specifying its exact location was not of par- amount importance.16 The Casey Court did not defend this unfocused analysis and instead grounded its decision solely on the theory that the right to obtain an abortion is part of the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”

6.              A new argument: equal protection

Since only women can have abortions, abortion laws discriminate against women on the basis of their sex.

III.      ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY

A.              At this point, the Court undertakes an extensive analysis of the law prior to Roe respecting abortion. The Court does not find good evidence to support a conclusion that abortion was a “right” “implicit” in the law and the expectations of the law. This forms a great deal of the opinion and is supported by an “appendix” which catalogues abortion laws pre-Roe.

B.              Conclusion: The inescapable conclusion is that a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions. On the contrary, an unbroken tradition of prohibiting abortion on pain of criminal punishment persisted from the earliest days of the common law until 1973. The Court in Roe could have said of abortion exactly what Glucksberg said of assisted suicide: “Attitudes toward [abortion] have changed since Bracton, but our laws have consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, [that practice].” 521 U. S., at 719.”

C.              But what about the contrary evidence, “Respondents and their amici have no persuasive answer to this historical evidence.” [discussion follows]

D.             What about the evidence in Roe?

1. “Roe relied largely on two articles by a pro-abortion advocate who claimed that Coke had intentionally misstated the common law because of his strong anti-abortion views.37 These articles have been discredited,38 and it has come to light that even members of Jane Roe’s legal team did not regard them as serious scholarship. An internal memorandum characterized this author’s work as donning “the guise of impartial scholar- ship while advancing the proper ideological goals.”3 Con- tinued reliance on such scholarship is unsupportable.”

2.              The Dissent.

Later on in the decisions, the Court makes the following note about the dissent:

“The dissent is very candid that it cannot show that a constitutional right to abortion has any foundation, let alone a “‘deeply rooted’” one, “‘in this Nation’s history and tradition.’ ” Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721; see post, at 12–14 (joint opinion of BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.). The dissent does not identify any pre-Roe authority that supports such a right—no state constitutional provision or statute, no federal or state judicial precedent, not even a scholarly treatise. Compare post, at 12–14, n. 2, with su- pra, at 15–16, and n. 23. Nor does the dissent dispute the fact that abortion was illegal at common law at least after quickening; that the 19th century saw a trend toward crim- inalization of pre-quickening abortions; that by 1868, a su- permajority of States (at least 26 of 37) had enacted stat- utes criminalizing abortion at all stages of pregnancy; that by the late 1950s at least 46 States prohibited abortion “however and whenever performed” except if necessary to save “the life of the mother,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 139; and that when Roe was decided in 1973 similar statutes were still in effect in 30 States. Compare post, at 12–14, nn. 2–3, with supra, at 23–25, and nn. 33–34

“The dissent’s failure to engage with this long tradition is devastating to its position. We have held that the “established method of substantive-due-process analysis” requires that an unenumerated right be “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ ” before it can be recog- nized as a component of the “liberty” protected in the Due Process Clause. Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721; cf. Timbs, 586 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). But despite the dissent’s professed fidelity to stare decisis, it fails to seriously engage with that important precedent—which it cannot possibly satisfy.”

E.              The “Entrenched Right” Argument

“Instead of seriously pressing the argument that the abortion right itself has deep roots, supporters of Roe and Casey contend that the abortion right is an integral part of a broader entrenched right. Roe termed this a right to pri-vacy, 410 U. S., at 154, and Casey described it as the free- dom to make “intimate and personal choices” that are “central to personal dignity and autonomy,” 505 U. S., at 851. Casey elaborated: “At the heart of liberty is the right to de- fine one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni- verse, and of the mystery of human life.” Ibid.”

1. Essentially, Roe created a Right, but that Right is now so “entrenched” it should not be set aside.

2. The Court considers this issue whenin the context of “ordered liberty.”

This right is so important that to not continue to assert it would upset the structure of society.

“Ordered liberty sets limits and defines the boundary between competing interests. Roe and Casey each struck a particular balance between the interests of a woman who wants an abortion and the interests of what they termed “potential life.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 150 (emphasis deleted); Casey, 505 U. S., at 852. But the people of the various States may evaluate those interests differently. In some States, voters may believe that the abortion right should be even more extensive than the right that Roe and Casey recognized. Voters in other States may wish to impose tight restrictions based on their belief that abortion destroys an “unborn human being.” Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191(4)(b). Our Nation’s historical understanding of ordered liberty does not prevent the people’s elected representatives from deciding how abortion should be regulated.”

3.              Distinguishing other cases

This is an important aspect of the analysis. There are a handful of other cases involving implicit rights. One of the arguments against Roe has been that if you overrule Roe, states will make it illegal for people with different skin colors to marry. The Court rejects this argument as follows. Since it is an important part of the argument politically, here it is:

“Nor does the right to obtain an abortion have a sound basis in precedent. Casey relied on cases involving the right to marry a person of a different race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); the right to marry while in prison, Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987); the right to obtain contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U. S. 678 (1977); the right to reside with relatives, Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977); the right to make decisions about the education of one’s chil- dren, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); the right not to be steri- lized without consent, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. William- son, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); and the right in certain circum- stances not to undergo involuntary surgery, forced administration of drugs, or other substantially similar pro- cedures, Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753 (1985), Washington v. Harper, 494 U. S. 210 (1990), Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952). Respondents and the Solicitor General also rely on post-Casey decisions like Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (right to engage in private, consensual sexual acts), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to marry a person of the same sex). See Brief for Re- spondents 18; Brief for United States 23–24.

“These attempts to justify abortion through appeals to a broader right to autonomy and to define one’s “concept of existence” prove too much. Casey, 505 U. S., at 851. Those criteria, at a high level of generality, could license funda- mental rights to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F. 3d 1440, 1444 (CA9 1996) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). None of these rights has any claim to being deeply rooted in history. Id., at 1440, 1445.

“What sharply distinguishes the abortion right from the rights recognized in the cases on which Roe and Casey rely is something that both those decisions acknowledged: Abor- tion destroys what those decisions call “potential life” and what the law at issue in this case regards as the life of an “unborn human being.” See Roe, 410 U. S., at 159 (abortion is “inherently different”); Casey, 505 U. S., at 852 (abortion is “a unique act”). None of the other decisions cited by Roe and Casey involved the critical moral question posed by abortion. They are therefore inapposite. They do not sup- port the right to obtain an abortion, and by the same token, our conclusion that the Constitution does not confer such a right does not undermine them in any way.

“In drawing this critical distinction between the abortion right and other rights, it is not necessary to dispute Casey’s claim (which we accept for the sake of argument) that “the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment” do not “mar[k] the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.” 505 U. S., at 848. Abortion is nothing new. It has been addressed by lawmakers for centuries, and the fundamental moral question that it poses is ageless.

“Defenders of Roe and Casey do not claim that any new scientific learning calls for a different answer to the under- lying moral question, but they do contend that changes in society require the recognition of a constitutional right to obtain an abortion. Without the availability of abortion, they maintain, people will be inhibited from exercising their freedom to choose the types of relationships they de- sire, and women will be unable to compete with men in the workplace and in other endeavors.”

The dissent attempts to obscure this failure by misrepre- senting our application of Glucksberg. The dissent suggests that we have focused only on “the legal status of abortion in the 19th century,” post, at 26, but our review of this Na- tion’s tradition extends well past that period. As explained, for more than a century after 1868—including “another half-century” after women gained the constitutional right to vote in 1920, see post, at 15; Amdt. 19—it was firmly es- tablished that laws prohibiting abortion like the Texas law at issue in Roe were permissible exercises of state regula- tory authority. And today, another half century later, more than half of the States have asked us to overrule Roe and Casey. The dissent cannot establish that a right to abortion has ever been part of this Nation’s tradition.

IV.            STARE DECISIS

This is a technical legal argument about when a previous Supreme Court decision may be overturned. This argument assumes that Roe was wrong or at least not well decided. Yet, since it has been law for 50 years, perhaps we should just let it go, because “fixing the mistake” will be worse than just permitting it to continue.

A.              What is the good of Stare Decisis?

“We next consider whether the doctrine of stare decisis counsels continued acceptance of Roe and Casey. Stare de- cisis plays an important role in our case law, and we have explained that it serves many valuable ends. It protects the interests of those who have taken action in reliance on a past decision. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 856 (joint opinion); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991). It “reduces incentives for challenging settled precedents, saving parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.” Kimble, 576 U. S., at 455. It fosters “evenhanded” decisionmaking by requiring that like cases be decided in a like manner. Payne, 501 U. S., at 827. It “contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Ibid. And it restrains judicial hubris and reminds us to respect the judgment of those who have grappled with important questions in the past. “Precedent is a way of accumulating and passing down the learning of past generations, a font of established wisdom richer than what can be found in any single judge or panel of judges.” N. Gorsuch, A Republic, If You Can Keep It 217 (2019).”

B.              It is not absolute:

“We have long recognized, however, that stare decisis is “not an inexorable command,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 233 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), and it “is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitu- tion,” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 235 (1997). It has been said that it is sometimes more important that an issue “ ‘be settled than that it be settled right.’ ” Kimble, 576 U. S., at 455 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). But when it comes to the interpretation of the Constitution— the “great charter of our liberties,” which was meant “to endure through a long lapse of ages,” Martin v. Hunter’s Les- see, 1 Wheat. 304, 326 (1816) (opinion for the Court by Story, J.)—we place a high value on having the matter “set- tled right.” In addition, when one of our constitutional de- cisions goes astray, the country is usually stuck with the bad decision unless we correct our own mistake. An erro- neous constitutional decision can be fixed by amending the Constitution, but our Constitution is notoriously hard to amend. See Art. V; Kimble, 576 U. S., at 456. Therefore, in appropriate circumstances we must be willing to reconsider and, if necessary, overrule constitutional decisions.”

C.              Examples of good that was done in overturning bad decisions

This is important, because it is a response to the argument that the Court rarely if ever should overturn decisions. The response is sometimes our best work was overturning bad decisions:

“Some of our most important constitutional decisions have overruled prior precedents. We mention three. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court re- pudiated the “separate but equal” doctrine, which had al- lowed States to maintain racially segregated schools and other facilities. Id., at 488 (internal quotation marks omit- ted). In so doing, the Court overruled the infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), along with six other Supreme Court precedents that had applied the separate-but-equal rule. See Brown, 347 U. S., at 491.  In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937), the Court overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D. C., 261 U. S. 525 (1923), which had held that a law setting min- imum wages for women violated the “liberty” protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id., at 545. West Coast Hotel signaled the demise of an entire line of important precedents that had protected an individual lib- erty right against state and federal health and welfare leg- islation. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905) (holding invalid a law setting maximum working hours); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915) (holding invalid a law banning contracts forbidding employees to join a union); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504 (1924) (hold- ing invalid laws fixing the weight of loaves of bread).

“Finally, in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), after the lapse of only three years, the Court overruled Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940), and held that public school students could not be compelled to salute the flag in violation of their sincere be- liefs. Barnette stands out because nothing had changed during the intervening period other than the Court’s be- lated recognition that its earlier decision had been seriously wrong.”

Numerous other decisions are cited.

D.             There are five reasons to overturn Roe/Casey:

1.              “The nature of the Court’s error. An erroneous interpretation of the Constitution is always important, but some are more damaging than others.”

“Roe was also egregiously wrong and deeply damaging. For reasons already explained, Roe’s constitutional analysis was far outside the bounds of any reasonable interpretation of the various constitutional provisions to which it vaguely pointed.”

2.              “The quality of the reasoning. Under our precedents, the quality of the reasoning in a prior case has an important bearing on whether it should be reconsidered. See Janus, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 38); Ramos, 590 U. S., at ___– ___ (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 7–8). In Part II, supra, we explained why Roe was incorrectly decided, but that decision was more than just wrong. It stood on exceptionally weak grounds.”

An analysis of the weakness of Roe’s reasoning follows.

a.              “The weaknesses in Roe’s reasoning are well-known. Without any grounding in the constitutional text, history, or precedent, it imposed on the entire country a detailed set of rules much like those that one might expect to find in a statute or regulation.”

b.              Here the Court cites to Professor Tribe, an outstanding scholar of the left:

“Here is the Court’s entire explanation: “With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at vi- ability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the womb.” 410 U. S., at 163. As Professor Laurence Tribe has written, “[c]learly, this mistakes ‘a definition for a syllogism.’ ” Tribe 4 (quoting Ely 924).”

The implicit argument: even those who defend abortion think Roe is poorly reasoned.

c.               “All in all, Roe’s reasoning was exceedingly weak, and ac- ademic commentators, including those who agreed with the decision as a matter of policy, were unsparing in their criticism.”

3.              “Workability. Our precedents counsel that another important consideration in deciding whether a precedent should be overruled is whether the rule it imposes is work- able—that is, whether it can be understood and applied in a consistent and predictable manner. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. 778, 792 (2009); Patterson v. McLean Credit Un- ion, 491 U. S. 164, 173 (1989); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S. 271, 283–284 (1988). Ca- sey’s “undue burden” test has scored poorly on the worka- bility scale. Problem begin with the very concept of an “undue bur- den.” As Justice Scalia noted in his Casey partial dissent, determining whether a burden is “due” or “undue” is “inher- ently standardless.” 505 U. S., at 992; see also June Medi- cal Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 17) (“[W]hether a bur- den is deemed undue depends heavily on which factors the judge considers and how much weight he accords each of them” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).”

4.              “Effect on other areas of law. Roe and Casey have led to the distortion of many important but unrelated legal doctrines, and that effect provides further support for overrul- ing those decisions. See Ramos, 590 U. S., at ___ (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 8); Janus, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 34).” The linguistic efforts to support Roe have led the Court to engage in strained and wrong arguments which have poisoned other cases.

5.              “Reliance interests. We last consider whether overruling Roe and Casey will upend substantial reliance interests.”

a.              If I enter in a contract, I would like the assurance that the law will permit me to enforce the contract tomorrow.

b.              But regular reliance does not take place here: you don’t go out to get pregnant so that you can an abortion. And if you do, you can make sure not to get pregnant in Mississippi.

6.              The Counter: But overturning these decisions will mean that states will outlaw birth control. “Unable to show concrete reliance on Roe and Casey them- selves, the Solicitor General suggests that overruling those decisions would “threaten the Court’s precedents holding that the Due Process Clause protects other rights.” Brief for United States 26 (citing Obergefell, 576 U. S. 644; Law- rence, 539 U. S. 558; Griswold, 381 U. S. 479). That is not correct for reasons we have already discussed. As even the Casey plurality recognized, “[a]bortion is a unique act” be- cause it terminates “life or potential life.” 505 U. S., at 852; see also Roe, 410 U. S., at 159 (abortion is “inherently dif- ferent from marital intimacy,” “marriage,” or “procreation”). And to ensure that our decision is not misunderstood or mischaracterized, we emphasize that our decision con- cerns the constitutional right to abortion and no other right. Nothing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.”

E.              This will ruin the Court’s integrity.

“The argument was cast in different terms, but stated simply, it was essentially as follows. The American people’s belief in the rule of law would be shaken if they lost respect for this Court as an institution that decides important cases based on principle, not “social and political pressures.” 505 U. S., at 865. There is a special danger that the public will perceive a decision as having been made for unprincipled reasons when the Court overrules a controversial “water- shed” decision, such as Roe. 505 U. S., at 866–867. A deci- sion overruling Roe would be perceived as having been made “under fire” and as a “surrender to political pressure,” 505 U. S., at 867, and therefore the preservation of public approval of the Court weighs heavily in favor of retaining Roe, see 505 U. S., at 869.”

1. This is essentially a political not a legal argument. The political process needs Roe to stay in place.

2.  Well, Casey and Roe certainly have not helped the political process: “Neither decision has ended debate over the issue of a constitutional right to obtain an abortion. Indeed, in this case, 26 States expressly ask us to overrule Roe and Casey and to return the issue of abortion to the people and their elected representatives. This Court’s inability to end de- bate on the issue should not have been surprising. This Court cannot bring about the permanent resolution of a rancorous national controversy simply by dictating a settlement and telling the people to move on.”

3.  That’s not our job. “We do not pretend to know how our political system or society will respond to today’s decision overruling Roe and Casey. And even if we could foresee what will happen, we would have no authority to let that knowledge influence our decision. We can only do our job, which is to interpret the law, apply longstanding principles of stare decisis, and de- cide this case accordingly. “

V.              HOLDING

“We therefore hold that the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion. Roe and Casey must be overruled, and the authority to regulate abortion must be returned to the people and their elected representatives.”

Building a Resurrection

22 Wednesday Jun 2022

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I have been wondering  what is the substrate which is holding so much of what goes by “progressivism” together.  In what way does an extremist view on abortion, transgenderism, sexualizing children, expressive individualism coupled to collectivism which brooks no compromise. And I keep coming around to the same sort of conclusion.

I was pushed a bit further along this line while reading “The Billionaire Family Pushing Synthetic Sex Identities (SSI).”  The article details the Pritzker family’s bankrolling much of the “research” and advocacy in this area. Within that article, there is a cross-reference to this organization: https://terasemcentral.org/about.html

Under “science” we find a link to an article in the International Journal of Machine Consciousness (which I had not previously read): https://terasemcentral.org/docs/Terasem_Mind_Uploading_Experiment_IJMC.pdf

The article contends that it will become possible to replicate one’s consciousness in a computerized system. Effectively, there would be a resurrection of the person’s consciousness:

“Specifically, is it possible that software written a few decades from now, and paired with a database of video interviews of and associated information about a predecessor person, will be able to faithfully mimic the workings of this predecessor’s mind? An empirical answer can be obtained by tasking psychologists to determine whether they believe the new software-based mind appears to have a consciousness that is equivalent to that of its predecessor brain-based person. I have set up an experiment to see whether or not this is so. If it is, I believe the software-based mind is a techno-immortalized continuation of the predecessor’s identity. While the software- based mind will realize it is not the original brain-based mind, just as each human adult realizes they are not their teenage mind, or even the precise mind of the previous day, this fact of personal consciousness °ux does not undermine the continuity of unique identity.”

It would one’s life divorced from one’s body. It is interesting that it is not precisely the continuance of one’s disembodied soul, but rather a rejection of the body and a replicated (resurrected) consciousness without the substrate of a brain.  (“Throughout history there has never been a mind without a brain. It is the brain that has billions of neurons and trillions of synapses to provide the patterns of electro- chemical connectivity that, writ with extraordinary complexity, give rise to environmental representations, analyses and choices that are the hallmarks of a mind. The brain is to the mind as objects that are counted are to numbers. Some physical substrates, such as brains and abacus beads, necessarily entail non-physical phenomena, such as minds and math.”)

The “transgender” sexual identity, the belief that there is a consciousness which is somehow non-conforming to my body (that my body is not me): “In many regards it is not a very different quest from trying to discover the true state of a purported consciousness revived from a mind file. In both cases one must judge if the consciousness being presented is a fake or is authentic. Does the consciousness being presented represent an authentic analog (albeit with different gender or substrate), or does it represent discontinuity (such as a different personality that has taken root in a new gender or substrate)?”

Anyway, back to the original question.

There is something profoundly important about the human body. To remedy the fault of sin in the creation, it was necessary that God become incarnate in an actual human body. Indeed, one of the earliest heresies was the argument that Jesus only “seemed” to have a body. The true physicality of Jesus, in life, death, and resurrection is bedrock Christian faith.

The physical resurrection of the human body is key to the great hope of the Christian life.

The various strands of this “progressive” ideology seems to be ultimately a distain for the human body.  The body is a constraint and limitation which must be avoided.

The distain for the body easily translates into a willingness to engage in any sort of action to or with the body (as the early Gnostics who would either be profligate or ascetic). The death or enslavement of other bodies (provided they are sufficient far away) is permissible.

There is also a sort of disembodiment in the collective, as I become part of something bigger.

It is not necessarily a coherent set of ideals, but it does seem to gather around a certain core.

I am still thinking the matter through, but evasion of the body as a means of redemption and immortality seems to lie at the core.

Analysis of the Decision in 303 Creative

11 Wednesday Aug 2021

Posted by in first amendment, law

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The decision of the 10th Circuit in 303 Creative LLC, et al. v. Elenis, et al. is a remarkable decision for its rejection what should be undisputed constitutional principles. As Ed Whelan wrote in Bonkers Tenth Circuit Ruling Against Free Speech, “It is difficult to imagine a ruling more hostile to free speech.”  The case involved a Christian web developer who said she was unwilling to make a webpage which celebrated a same-sex wedding.

This was not the case of someone who refused to serve a gay customer. The designer specifically stated that it was not the identity of the customer but the content of the message which was the issue: “303 Creative is a for-profit, graphic and website design company; Ms. Smith is its founder and sole member-owner. Appellants are willing to work with all people regardless of sexual orientation. Appellants are also generally willing to create graphics or websites for lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (“LGBT”) customers. Ms. Smith sincerely believes, however, that same-sex marriage conflicts with God’s will.”

The court found that the creation of the website was “speech,” “Appellants’ creation of wedding websites is pure speech.” This is important because in cases such those involving a baker or a florist, there was an issue as to whether the work itself (decorating a cake, arranging flowers) constitutes speech for purposes of the First Amendment. Thus, the speech clause of the First Amendment was unquestionably in play.

Second, the court found that speech at issue also entailed the plaintiff’s religious convictions,  “Ms. Smith holds a sincere religious belief that prevents her from creating websites that celebrate same-sex marriages.”

Free exercise of religion and freedom of speech are guaranteed in First Amendment. Having found speech and religion, it seems that the plaintiff should have easily prevailed. But here, the court found the government could compel speech (and also religious practice).

The First Amendment prohibits compelled speech. (United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001); see, Wooley v. Maynard 430 U.S. 705, 714-15, supra) The act of government compulsion as to speech is always demeaning and always wrong. (Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31 (2018) 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018) [“When speech is compelled, however, additional damage is done. In that situation, individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions. Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning, and for this reason, one of our landmark free speech cases said that a law commanding “involuntary affirmation” of objected-to beliefs would require “even more immediate and urgent grounds” than a law demanding silence. Barnette, supra, at 633, 63 S.Ct. 1178; see also Riley, supra, at 796–797, 108 S.Ct. 2667 (rejecting “deferential test” for compelled speech claims).”])

Since this case involves compelled speech, it seems she should have won, but she did not.

The court found that the law was a content-based restriction on speech, meaning that it prohibited certain speech based upon the content of that speech. With few very narrow exceptions (such as a true threats), content based restrictions are simply struck down.

And yet, the 303 court found the State of Colorado could compel Ms. Smith to publicly approve same sex marriage (or be barred from being a web-designer in the state), “We hold that CADA [the law at issue] satisfies strict scrutiny, and thus permissibly compels Appellants’ speech.” The decision also compels Ms. Smith to contradict her religious beliefs and participate in a religious rite if she wants to conduct any business in Colorado.

How did this happen? How could a court find that the government can compel speech, forbid other speech and compel religious practice as the cost of doing business in the State of Colorado?

First, Ms. Smith’s solo operation had to be designated as a “public accommodation.”  The statute defines a public accommodation as a business which is open to the public, “any place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place offering services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to the public.” Such a definition runs contrary to the history of the meaning of the phrase “public accommodation.” Public accommodations entail public carriers (like a bus line), public accommodations (like a hotel on the interstate). The concept has a long history in American law and then English common law before that. And it is only recently that solo operators have become “public accommodations.”

But the court did more than turn her into a public accommodation, it actually turned her into a special sort of public accommodation: the monopoly, which by virtue of being a monopoly must be open to the public.

The nature of “public accommodations” and the way in which Ms. Smith became a monopoly will be discussed next.

Risk and Politics

06 Wednesday May 2020

Posted by in Politics, Uncategorized

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Just a thought about risks and costs and politics. It was known that a plague was always going to happen. Such things are unavoidable. Globalization made a rapid dissemination of a disease easy and cheap. But the costs of preparation are great and they have to be paid before the risks exists. Second, there is a tendency for things to never become as bad as they could. And no one wants to looked panicked and over-react. Preppers are roundly mocked for being, well, prepared.

But after the bad thing happens, the people who are injured can all complain about the lack of preparation.

If you’re politician, it makes sense to not prepare. (I’m not saying that it is wise, good, or morally acceptable; only that it makes sense if you’re a politician.)

If you prepare now for a future problem, you are spending current money on a currently non-existent problem. The problem may or may not come to pass in X years. The politician will probably be retired in X-1 years. Therefore, not preparing won’t hurt me.

In the present crisis, very few people are complaining about prior governors or presidents or mayors who failed to prepare. The complaints are directed to the current politicians, who are like the last child standing in musical chairs.

To illustrate this point further, consider this:  The earth’s magnetic field is weakening. The magnetic poles may shift. When this shift takes place, it will cause enormous damage to our economy. People will die. It will cause problems quite beyond the current virus.

There are things which can be done to protect against this event. However, those actions will be extraordinarily expensive.

Since no one knows when the poles will shift, no one knows if the end of the world is close or a 1,000-years away. Thus, this real and unimaginably bad event is not being planned for right now. No country is undertaking the expense to protect against it, because it would be politically impossible to undertake the expense.

Or consider the San Andreas fault in California. There will be a massive earthquake some day — any day. In fact, in California we are constantly living under the threat that at any minute my house might collapse and the infrastructure be torn to pieces. Yet, how many people undertake the minimal steps to prepare?

People get ready every now and then – and then we forget where we put the extra water and our stored can goods go bad. It’s hard to keep up the intensity for some unspecified future event.

It is almost as if we live as if we would live forever.

Kuyper, Common Grace 1.10

09 Monday Dec 2019

Posted by in Abraham Kuyper, Politics, Uncategorized

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The prior post in this series may be found here.

In Chapter 10, Kuyper considers the issue of governmental legitimacy. The question of legitimacy is of great importance in the matter of government. If a government is legitimate, then the population willing submits to the government and the government rightfully enacts and enforces law.

Most people never consider the basis for legitimacy; rather, we all just know that a government is legitimate or not. For example, in a monarchy, everyone knows that the child of the sovereign is the next sovereign. In a democracy, everyone knows that the winner of a popularity contest may enact law. In both cases, everyone knows that some random crank who declares himself sovereign – even with an elaborate ceremony – is just a crank and not a king.

Conversely, if everyone in a nation were to suddenly know that the leadership was illegitimate, the government would then be nothing other than bandits and tyrants.

How then does legitimacy come to be?

Kuyper considers and rejects three theories of legitimacy. First there the right of a conqueror. At the beginning, a conqueror’s power maintains as long as he is able to maintain sufficient military might to quell any opposition. However, after some time, the duration of rule itself becomes the legitimatizing basis of rule. The trouble here is moral: we don’t forgive a murderer because he murdered to rob and then was able to hold off anyone who attempted to prosecute him for his murder and robbery. Indeed, such a man would be considered peculiarly evil.

A second theory is the “social contract” model: whereby initially free people contract to form a government which has legitimate power based upon the concession of others. A primary trouble here is that such a claim is based upon a fiction: no such universal contractual decision has ever been undertaken by previously unruled individuals.

A third theory looks to spontaneous ordering: such spontaneous development theories appear more factual than the other theories: but this theory too appears as morally questionable. Kuyper raises two objections: (1) The theory cannot distinguish between a morally good and a morally bad order: cruelty and deceit or heroism and virtue could each lead to an actual government of some sort.

(2) Kuyper explains that such a theory is pantheistic: Rather than government be a determined act of God; authority would be something inherent in all that is. Thus, might would be right, because it is.

Having rejected these alternatives, Kuyper explains that what government does itself must be the result of a gracious act of God: not a peculiar saving grace, such as shown to the elect; but, a “common grace” to order the world in such a manner as to limit the effective scope of sin.

Thus, there is the effectuation of a government and the providential placement of a leader in position. Kuyper then explains the basis of legitimacy: if the leader and the populace both accede that God has created the structure, the structure is and all “are accountable to God for the things they know they have done for or against that authority.” Abraham Kuyper, Common Grace: God’s Gifts for a Fallen World: The Historical Section, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, Melvin Flikkema, and Stephen J. Grabill, trans. Nelson D. Kloosterman and Ed M. van der Maas, vol. 1, Abraham Kuyper Collected Works in Public Theology (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press; Acton Institute, 2015), 95–96.

How then is this authority known? It can only come from God, because humans by nature have authority over nothing. The authority granted in Genesis 1 is granted by God: it is not inherent in the creature. God had the authority to grant or forbid the Adam to eat of trees in the Garden – and the authority over all other actions of Adam.

Not having even the least of authority, we certain have no authority by nature over one-another. Kuyper concedes that some sort of pre-Flood governmental authority must have arisen; but such authority would have existed without divine sanction.

A Note on Christian Politics

05 Saturday Oct 2019

Posted by in Politics, Uncategorized, William Gurnall

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William Gurnall noting how Paul responded to being imprisoned:

But how doth this great apostle spend his time in prison? Not in publishing invectives against those, though the worst of men, who had laid him in; a piece of zeal which the holy sufferers of those times were little acquainted with: nor in politic councils, how he might wind himself out of his trouble, by sordid flattery of, or sinful compliance with, the great ones of the times. Some would have used any picklock to have opened a passage to their liberty, and not scrupled, so escape they might, whether they got out at the door or window: but this holy man was not so fond of liberty or life, as to purchase them at the least hazard to the gospel.

He knew too much of another world, to bid so high for the enjoying of this; and therefore he is fearless what his enemies can do with him, well knowing he was sure of going to heaven whether they would or not. No, the great care which lay upon him, was for the churches of Christ; as a faithful steward, he labours to set this house of God in order before his departure. We read of no despatches sent to court to procure his liberty; but many to the churches to help them to stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made them free.

There is no such way to be even with the devil and his instruments, for all their spite against us, as by doing what good we can wherever we are. The devil had as good have let Paul alone, for he no sooner comes into prison but he falls a preaching, at which the gates of Satan’s prison fly open, and poor sinners come forth. Happy for Onesimus that Paul was sent to gaol; God had an errand for Paul to do to him and others, which the devil never dreamed of.

 William Gurnall and John Campbell, The Christian in Complete Armour (London: Thomas Tegg, 1845), 1.

Gurnall’s observations in The Christian in Complete Armour are echoed by Wang Yi’s statement released by his congregation, after his arrest by the Chinese Government:

My Declaration of Faithful Disobedience

On the basis of the teachings of the Bible and the mission of the gospel, I respect the authorities God has established in China. For God deposes kings and raises up kings. This is why I submit to the historical and institutional arrangements of God in China.

As a pastor of a Christian church, I have my own understanding and views, based on the Bible, about what righteous order and good government is. At the same time, I am filled with anger and disgust at the persecution of the church by this Communist regime, at the wickedness of their depriving people of the freedoms of religion and of conscience. But changing social and political institutions is not the mission I have been called to, and it is not the goal for which God has given his people the gospel.

For all hideous realities, unrighteous politics, and arbitrary laws manifest the cross of Jesus Christ, the only means by which every Chinese person must be saved. They also manifest the fact that true hope and a perfect society will never be found in the transformation of any earthly institution or culture but only in our sins being freely forgiven by Christ and in the hope of eternal life.

As a pastor, my firm belief in the gospel, my teaching, and my rebuking of all evil proceeds from Christ’s command in the gospel and from the unfathomable love of that glorious King. Every man’s life is extremely short, and God fervently commands the church to lead and call any man to repentance who is willing to repent. Christ is eager and willing to forgive all who turn from their sins. This is the goal of all the efforts of the church in China—to testify to the world about our Christ, to testify to the Middle Kingdom about the Kingdom of Heaven, to testify to earthly, momentary lives about heavenly, eternal life. This is also the pastoral calling that I have received.

For this reason, I accept and respect the fact that this Communist regime has been allowed by God to rule temporarily. As the Lord’s servant John Calvin said, wicked rulers are the judgment of God on a wicked people, the goal being to urge God’s people to repent and turn again toward Him. For this reason, I am joyfully willing to submit myself to their enforcement of the law as though submitting to the discipline and training of the Lord.

At the same time, I believe that this Communist regime’s persecution against the church is a greatly wicked, unlawful action. As a pastor of a Christian church, I must denounce this wickedness openly and severely. The calling that I have received requires me to use non-violent methods to disobey those human laws that disobey the Bible and God. My Savior Christ also requires me to joyfully bear all costs for disobeying wicked laws.

But this does not mean that my personal disobedience and the disobedience of the church is in any sense “fighting for rights” or political activism in the form of civil disobedience, because I do not have the intention of changing any institutions or laws of China. As a pastor, the only thing I care about is the disruption of man’s sinful nature by this faithful disobedience and the testimony it bears for the cross of Christ.

As a pastor, my disobedience is one part of the gospel commission. Christ’s great commission requires of us great disobedience. The goal of disobedience is not to change the world but to testify about another world.

For the mission of the church is only to be the church and not to become a part of any secular institution. From a negative perspective, the church must separate itself from the world and keep itself from being institutionalized by the world. From a positive perspective, all acts of the church are attempts to prove to the world the real existence of another world. The Bible teaches us that, in all matters relating to the gospel and human conscience, we must obey God and not men. For this reason, spiritual disobedience and bodily suffering are both ways we testify to another eternal world and to another glorious King.

This is why I am not interested in changing any political or legal institutions in China. I’m not even interested in the question of when the Communist regime’s policies persecuting the church will change. Regardless of which regime I live under now or in the future, as long as the secular government continues to persecute the church, violating human consciences that belong to God alone, I will continue my faithful disobedience. For the entire commission God has given me is to let more Chinese people know through my actions that the hope of humanity and society is only in the redemption of Christ, in the supernatural, gracious sovereignty of God.

If God decides to use the persecution of this Communist regime against the church to help more Chinese people to despair of their futures, to lead them through a wilderness of spiritual disillusionment and through this to make them know Jesus, if through this he continues disciplining and building up his church, then I am joyfully willing to submit to God’s plans, for his plans are always benevolent and good.

Precisely because none of my words and actions are directed toward seeking and hoping for societal and political transformation, I have no fear of any social or political power. For the Bible teaches us that God establishes governmental authorities in order to terrorize evildoers, not to terrorize doers of good. If believers in Jesus do no wrong then they should not be afraid of dark powers. Even though I am often weak, I firmly believe this is the promise of the gospel. It is what I’ve devoted all of my energy to. It is the good news that I am spreading throughout Chinese society.

I also understand that this happens to be the very reason why the Communist regime is filled with fear at a church that is no longer afraid of it.

If I am imprisoned for a long or short period of time, if I can help reduce the authorities’ fear of my faith and of my Savior, I am very joyfully willing to help them in this way. But I know that only when I renounce all the wickedness of this persecution against the church and use peaceful means to disobey, will I truly be able to help the souls of the authorities and law enforcement. I hope God uses me, by means of first losing my personal freedom, to tell those who have deprived me of my personal freedom that there is an authority higher than their authority, and that there is a freedom that they cannot restrain, a freedom that fills the church of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ.

Regardless of what crime the government charges me with, whatever filth they fling at me, as long as this charge is related to my faith, my writings, my comments, and my teachings, it is merely a lie and temptation of demons. I categorically deny it. I will serve my sentence, but I will not serve the law. I will be executed, but I will not plead guilty.

Moreover, I must point out that persecution against the Lord’s church and against all Chinese people who believe in Jesus Christ is the most wicked and the most horrendous evil of Chinese society. This is not only a sin against Christians. It is also a sin against all non-Christians. For the government is brutally and ruthlessly threatening them and hindering them from coming to Jesus. There is no greater wickedness in the world than this.

If this regime is one day overthrown by God, it will be for no other reason than God’s righteous punishment and revenge for this evil. For on earth, there has only ever been a thousand-year church. There has never been a thousand-year government. There is only eternal faith. There is no eternal power.

Those who lock me up will one day be locked up by angels. Those who interrogate me will finally be questioned and judged by Christ.  When I think of this, the Lord fills me with a natural compassion and grief toward those who are attempting to and actively imprisoning me. Pray that the Lord would use me, that he would grant me patience and wisdom, that I might take the gospel to them.

Separate me from my wife and children, ruin my reputation, destroy my life and my family – the authorities are capable of doing all of these things. However, no one in this world can force me to renounce my faith; no one can make me change my life; and no one can raise me from the dead.

And so, respectable officers, stop committing evil. This is not for my benefit but rather for yours and your children’s. I plead earnestly with you to stay your hands, for why should you be willing to pay the price of eternal damnation in hell for the sake of a lowly sinner such as I?

Jesus is the Christ, son of the eternal, living God. He died for sinners and rose to life for us. He is my king and the king of the whole earth yesterday, today, and forever. I am his servant, and I am imprisoned because of this. I will resist in meekness those who resist God, and I will joyfully violate all laws that violate God’s laws.

The Lord’s servant,
Wang Yi

Christians and Political Hope

25 Sunday Aug 2019

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Another word to describe the error being criticized in the second lesson is utopianism. 76 The inability of the Mosaic covenant and Israel’s geopolitical kingdom to deliver a righteous and just political commmunity should have ended visions of heaven on earth by such means. Not even heavenly inscribed laws, divinely handpicked kings or God’s own temple presence could make a difference. Human nature itself needed changing. How strange then that Christians still approach the promise of new constitutions and presidential campaigns with utopian dreams! 77 Christians should rest their hopes for true justice and righteousness not upon the state but upon the son of David and the political community that he is forming: “My servant David shall be king over them, and they shall all have one shepherd. They shall walk in my rules and be careful to obey my statutes” (Ezek 37: 24).

Jonathan Leeman, Political Church

Isaiah on Political Leadership

08 Saturday Sep 2018

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After this week, this seems appropriate comment on politics:

1 Ah, the proud crown of the drunkards of Ephraim, and the fading flower of its glorious beauty, which is on the head of the rich valley of those overcome with wine!

2 Behold, the Lord has one who is mighty and strong; like a storm of hail, a destroying tempest, like a storm of mighty, overflowing waters, he casts down to the earth with his hand.

3 The proud crown of the drunkards of Ephraim will be trodden underfoot;

4 and the fading flower of its glorious beauty, which is on the head of the rich valley, will be like a first-ripe fig before the summer: when someone sees it, he swallows it as soon as it is in his hand.

5 In that day the LORD of hosts will be a crown of glory, and a diadem of beauty, to the remnant of his people,

6 and a spirit of justice to him who sits in judgment, and strength to those who turn back the battle at the gate.

7 These also reel with wine and stagger with strong drink; the priest and the prophet reel with strong drink, they are swallowed by wine, they stagger with strong drink, they reel in vision, they stumble in giving judgment.

8 For all tables are full of filthy vomit, with no space left.

Isa28.1-8

Gary Smith in the New American Commentary explains:

The prophet’s audience in Judah could learn several basic theological principles from this woe and salvation oracle. They would know that (a) God hates pride and incompetent leaders; (b) he punishes and removes proud and incompetent leaders; (c) people should glorify God (not any earthly place or political institution); and (d) God is a nation’s true source of strength and his justice provides true hope.

More “Religions”

08 Thursday Feb 2018

Posted by in Culture, Uncategorized

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I previously posted on politics as religion.  Here is yet another example:

Siegel: Liberalism has taken on a religious aspect. It’s a belief system, and not a system that represents political interests. Liberalism is seen as a source of grace, in religious terms. It is hard to talk to people, when you are effectively suggesting they are not among the blessed (or, to use Thomas Sowell’s phrase, the ‘anointed’), that they are in fact mistaken. Trump is wrong about many things, but you can argue with Trumpism. But it is very hard to argue with contemporary liberalism, especially in its West Coast incarnation.

Just prior to the Super Bowl, the Washington Post wrote on football as Tom Brady’s religion. This is nothing new. The Aztecs played a purposefully religious: “The Aztec ball game had a lot of ritual significance. It was mean to mirror the ball court of the heavens, this being the ball court of the underworld where the sun passed each night.” The games of the ancient Greeks were religious affairs such as the Olympics or Isthmian Games.

Sporting events as religious ceremony has been noted many times:

As Wann and collaborators note, various scholars discuss sport in terms of “natural religion,” “humanistic religion,” and “primitive polytheism” pointing out that “spectators worship other human beings, their achievements, and the groups to which they belong.” And that sports stadiums and arenas resemble “cathedrals where followers gather to worship their heroes and pray for their successes” (1, p. 200). Meanwhile, fans wear the team colors, and bear its flags, icons, and mascots whilst literally singing its praises.

Sport as Religion. Or as The Atlantic writes, “In short, if you look hard at sports, you can’t help but see contours of religion.”

 

 

Politics as Religion

23 Tuesday Jan 2018

Posted by in Politics, Uncategorized

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A few recent articles have made the point that political positions can function as religion: a totalizing story of sin and sacrifice which gives some sort of meaning to existence. First, there Ta Nehisi Coates with a theory of original sin:

What does the philosopher teach? His philosophy can be summed up in a passing phrase from “Between the World and Me”: “I… felt that the galaxy was playing with loaded dice.”

It’s a passing phrase, but a concept that suffuses his work. At a cosmic level, existence itself is slanted against the flourishing of black people. Chance is not really chance. We already know how history will unfold before it happens: black people will suffer because of white people. That’s what being black means. That’s what being white means.

Here is New York Magazine asking if intersectionality is a religion 

It posits a classic orthodoxy through which all of human experience is explained — and through which all speech must be filtered. Its version of original sin is the power of some identity groups over others. To overcome this sin, you need first to confess, i.e., “check your privilege,” and subsequently live your life and order your thoughts in a way that keeps this sin at bay. The sin goes so deep into your psyche, especially if you are white or male or straight, that a profound conversion is required.

The story continues with the obligatory swipe at the Puritans, which demonstrates that most people know nothing more about Puritans that what they can kind of remember from The Scarlet Letter and what they heard about The Crucible — neither of which has anything to do with the Puritans in reality.

Alan Jacobs asks if Wokeness is a Myth:

The term “woke,” for those who have managed to escape it, means being aware of racial, gender, and economic injustice. It is employed today either in mockery of the woke or in ironic reappropriation by the woke, and it is probably irrecoverable for serious use. But “woke” derives from “waking up” to how things are — and that ought to suggest that to commend wokeness is to invite people to participate in a mythical experience.

There is even redemption — sacrifice — required of this religion:

Go deeper into the cult, and the disciplines get more rigorous. Now white women must admit their role in oppressing women of color. This requires some of the groveling that white males must endure. But it offers the same benefit: a sense of forgiveness, and spiritual progress. Likewise black males must atone to women of color. All straights must bow down to gays. Even gays must make amends for their insensitivity to “trans” people. I am not sure to whom “trans” people of color must apologize. But give intellectuals time, and they’ll find someone. Or invent them.

With little work, I could find many more examples and certainly make a broader argument that all sides of political argument easily slide in a religious dimension — or that the arguments are informed by a story of fall, sin, punishment, sacrifice.

This is important to realize: just because a human being rejects some long-standing religious explanation does not mean that human beings change. The basic elements of fall-sin-punishment-sacrifice-possibly some escape/redemption are inherent in how we understand the world.

As a Christian, I would contend they are necessary for us our thinking. Paul argued for a hardwired, if you will explanation:

Romans 1:18–25 (ESV)

18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth. 19 For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. 20 For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse. 21 For although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their foolish hearts were darkened. 22 Claiming to be wise, they became fools, 23 and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man and birds and animals and creeping things.

24 Therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the dishonoring of their bodies among themselves, 25 because they exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever! Amen.